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Single Idea 15697
[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
]
Full Idea
With kind essentialism the person assumes that the world is divided up into preexisting natural categories. Individual essentialism seems not to require any such commitment to kind realism.
Gist of Idea
Kind (unlike individual) essentialism assumes preexisting natural categories
Source
Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'Essentialism')
Book Ref
Gelman,Susan A.: 'The Essential Child' [OUP 2005], p.152
A Reaction
This pinpoints my difficulty: how do we decide whether some category or attributed essence is part of a preexisting natural kind? Some natural kinds are self-evident, like water (roughly), but others need subtle teasing out. How is the teasing done?
The
27 ideas
with the same theme
[essence as belonging to a particular natural kind]:
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11188
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The Aristotelian view is that the essential properties are those that sort an object
[Aristotle, by Marcus (Barcan)]
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11196
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Essence is something in common between the natures which sort things into categories
[Aquinas]
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13074
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Only natural kinds and their members have real essences
[Suárez, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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17233
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Particulars contain universal things
[Hobbes]
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12530
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The less rational view of essences is that they are moulds for kinds of natural thing
[Locke]
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12532
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Even real essence depends on a sort, since it is sorts which have the properties
[Locke]
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12539
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If every sort has its real essence, one horse, being many sorts, will have many essences
[Locke]
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21218
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The sense of anything contingent has a purely apprehensible essence or Eidos
[Husserl]
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15106
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Essence is expressed by grammar
[Wittgenstein]
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11908
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Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties
[Mackie,P on Putnam]
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12679
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A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties
[Ellis]
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17055
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Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know
[Kripke]
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17523
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Sortals basically apply to individuals
[Ayers]
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15143
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Kind essences are the categorical bases of a thing's causal powers
[Bhaskar, by Chakravartty]
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11895
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A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed
[Brody, by Mackie,P]
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12141
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Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind?
[Brody]
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16509
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Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances
[Wiggins]
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12013
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Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts
[Forbes,G]
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15678
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Essentialism says categories have a true hidden nature which gives an object its identity
[Gelman]
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15683
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Sortals are needed for determining essence - the thing must be categorised first
[Gelman]
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15697
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Kind (unlike individual) essentialism assumes preexisting natural categories
[Gelman]
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12871
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Objects have their essential properties because of the kind of objects they are
[Simons]
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13129
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Essential kinds may be too specific to provide ontological categories
[Westerhoff]
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11909
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Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary
[Mackie,P]
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11899
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Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential?
[Mackie,P]
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15145
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A kind essence is the necessary and sufficient properties for membership of a class
[Chakravartty]
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10939
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'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential
[Rami]
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