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Single Idea 15701

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds ]

Full Idea

Children judged personal characteristics as more stable when they were referred to by a noun ('She is a carrot eater') than by a verbal predicate ('She eats carrots whenever she can')

Gist of Idea

Nouns seem to invoke stable kinds more than predicates do

Source

Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 08 'Naming')

Book Ref

Gelman,Susan A.: 'The Essential Child' [OUP 2005], p.189


A Reaction

This fits with my feeling that 'labels' are the basis of how the mind works. The noun invokes a genuine category of thing, where a predicate attaches to some preselected category ('she'). Gelman says names encourage inductions.


The 32 ideas from 'The Essential Child'

Essentialism is either natural to us, or an accident of our culture, or a necessary result of language [Gelman]
Essentialism comes from the cognitive need to categorise [Gelman]
Essentialism says categories have a true hidden nature which gives an object its identity [Gelman]
Sortals are needed for determining essence - the thing must be categorised first [Gelman]
Children's concepts include nonobvious features, like internal parts, functions and causes [Gelman]
Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders? [Gelman]
Even fairly simple animals make judgements based on categories [Gelman]
Folk essentialism rests on belief in natural kinds, in hidden properties, and on words indicating structures [Gelman]
Labels may indicate categories which embody an essence [Gelman]
Kinship is essence that comes in degrees, and age groups are essences that change over time [Gelman]
Categories are characterized by distance from a prototype [Gelman]
Theory-based concepts use rich models to show which similarities really matter [Gelman]
Causal properties are seen as more central to category concepts [Gelman]
Peope favor historical paths over outward properties when determining what something is [Gelman]
Kind (unlike individual) essentialism assumes preexisting natural categories [Gelman]
Children accept real stable categories, with nonobvious potential that gives causal explanations [Gelman]
People tend to be satisfied with shallow explanations [Gelman]
One sample of gold is enough, but one tree doesn't give the height of trees [Gelman]
Children overestimate the power of a single example [Gelman]
Children make errors in induction by focusing too much on categories [Gelman]
We found no evidence that mothers teach essentialism to their children [Gelman]
In India, upper-castes essentialize caste more than lower-castes do [Gelman]
Prelinguistic infants acquire and use many categories [Gelman]
Nouns seem to invoke stable kinds more than predicates do [Gelman]
Essentialism doesn't mean we know the essences [Gelman]
Memories often conform to a theory, rather than being neutral [Gelman]
Essentialism starts from richly structured categories, leading to a search for underlying properties [Gelman]
There is intentional, mechanical, teleological, essentialist, vitalist and deontological understanding [Gelman]
Inductive success is rewarded with more induction [Gelman]
Essentialism is useful for predictions, but it is not the actual structure of reality [Gelman]
Essentialism encourages us to think about the world scientifically [Gelman]
A major objection to real essences is the essentialising of social categories like race, caste and occupation [Gelman]