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Single Idea 15723

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions ]

Full Idea

The further a disposition is from those that can confidently be pinned on molecular structure or something comparably firm, the more our talk of it tends to depend on a vague factor of 'caeteris paribus'

Clarification

'Caeteris paribus' is the qualification 'all things being equal'

Gist of Idea

Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal'

Source

Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §46)

Book Ref

Quine,Willard: 'Word and Object' [MIT 1969], p.225


A Reaction

I approve of this. It is precisely the point of scientific essentialism, I take it. We are faced with innumerable uncertain dispositions, but once the underlying mechanisms are known, their role in nature becomes fairly precise.


The 25 ideas with the same theme [idea of a disposition towards certain behaviour]:

In the 17th century, 'disposition' usually just means the spatial arrangement of parts [Boyle, by Pasnau]
Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman]
Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine]
Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine]
Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged [Martin,CB]
To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong]
Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional [Ellis]
The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions [Ellis]
Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker]
We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Dennett, by Mumford]
Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar]
Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil]
Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford]
Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford]
Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford]
Dispositionality is a natural selection function, picking outcomes from the range of possibilities [Mumford/Anjum]
Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau]
I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability [Vetter]
Dispositions have directed behaviour which occurs if triggered [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
'Masked' dispositions fail to react because something intervenes [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A disposition is 'altered' when the stimulus reverses the disposition [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A disposition is 'mimicked' if a different cause produces that effect from that stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A 'trick' can look like a stimulus for a disposition which will happen without it [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
Some dispositions manifest themselves without a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
We could analyse dispositions as 'possibilities', with no mention of a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]