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Single Idea 15724

[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals ]

Full Idea

The subjunctive conditional has no place in an austere canonical notation for science - but that ban is less restrictive than would at first appear.

Gist of Idea

Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science

Source

Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §46)

Book Ref

Quine,Willard: 'Word and Object' [MIT 1969], p.225

A Reaction

Idea 15723 shows what he has in mind - that what science aims for is accounts of dispositional mechanisms, which then leave talk of other possible worlds (in Lewis style) as unnecessary. I may be with Quine one this one.

Related Idea

Idea 15723 Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine]

The 23 ideas with the same theme [facts in worlds different from the actual world]:

22303 It makes no sense to say that a true proposition could have been false [Russell]
12191 Counterfactuals are true if logical or natural laws imply the consequence [Goodman, by McFetridge]
15721 Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures [Quine]
15720 What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context [Quine]
15724 Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science [Quine]
15719 We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is [Quine]
3406 Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG]
15260 Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have [Harré/Madden]
8425 For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis]
8434 In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true [Lewis, by Horwich]
15462 Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis]
8431 Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis [Horwich]
6882 Counterfactuals presuppose a belief (or a fact) that the condition is false [Mautner]
6886 Counterfactuals are not true, they are merely valid [Mautner]
6885 Counterfactuals are true if in every world close to actual where p is the case, q is also the case [Mautner]
6884 Counterfactuals say 'If it had been, or were, p, then it would be q' [Mautner]
6883 Maybe counterfactuals are only true if they contain valid inference from premisses [Mautner]
14624 Counterfactual conditionals transmit possibility: (A□→B)⊃(◊A⊃◊B) [Williamson]
16249 A counterfactual antecedent commands the redescription of a selected moment [Maudlin]
14417 Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks]
21663 Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber]
19503 An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world [Pritchard,D]
14379 Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs]