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Single Idea 15724
[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
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Full Idea
The subjunctive conditional has no place in an austere canonical notation for science - but that ban is less restrictive than would at first appear.
Gist of Idea
Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science
Source
Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §46)
Book Ref
Quine,Willard: 'Word and Object' [MIT 1969], p.225
A Reaction
Idea 15723 shows what he has in mind - that what science aims for is accounts of dispositional mechanisms, which then leave talk of other possible worlds (in Lewis style) as unnecessary. I may be with Quine one this one.
Related Idea
Idea 15723
Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine]
The
23 ideas
with the same theme
[facts in worlds different from the actual world]:
22303
|
It makes no sense to say that a true proposition could have been false
[Russell]
|
12191
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Counterfactuals are true if logical or natural laws imply the consequence
[Goodman, by McFetridge]
|
15721
|
Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures
[Quine]
|
15720
|
What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context
[Quine]
|
15724
|
Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science
[Quine]
|
15719
|
We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is
[Quine]
|
3406
|
Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds
[Kim, by PG]
|
15260
|
Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have
[Harré/Madden]
|
8425
|
For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality
[Lewis]
|
8434
|
In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true
[Lewis, by Horwich]
|
15462
|
Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents
[Lewis]
|
8431
|
Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis
[Horwich]
|
6886
|
Counterfactuals are not true, they are merely valid
[Mautner]
|
6882
|
Counterfactuals presuppose a belief (or a fact) that the condition is false
[Mautner]
|
6885
|
Counterfactuals are true if in every world close to actual where p is the case, q is also the case
[Mautner]
|
6884
|
Counterfactuals say 'If it had been, or were, p, then it would be q'
[Mautner]
|
6883
|
Maybe counterfactuals are only true if they contain valid inference from premisses
[Mautner]
|
14624
|
Counterfactual conditionals transmit possibility: (A□→B)⊃(◊A⊃◊B)
[Williamson]
|
16249
|
A counterfactual antecedent commands the redescription of a selected moment
[Maudlin]
|
14417
|
Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base
[Merricks]
|
21663
|
Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes
[Hofweber]
|
19503
|
An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world
[Pritchard,D]
|
14379
|
Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent
[Jacobs]
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