more on this theme
|
more from this thinker
Single Idea 15735
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
]
Full Idea
I have made no place for properties that admit of degree, so that things may have more or less of the same property. There are plain properties, and then there are relations to them.
Gist of Idea
Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them
Source
David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5)
Book Ref
Lewis,David: 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [Blackwell 2001], p.53
A Reaction
An interesting question, little discussed. Elsewhere, Lewis ascribes all vagueness to our inadequate predicates, rather than to the world, which I find quite persuasive.
The
94 ideas
from 'On the Plurality of Worlds'
10470
|
There are only two kinds: sets, and possibilia (actual and possible particulars)
[Lewis, by Oliver]
|
12255
|
For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual
[Oderberg on Lewis]
|
9219
|
Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets
[Lewis, by Sider]
|
15022
|
If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality
[Sider on Lewis]
|
16441
|
Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets
[Lewis, by Stalnaker]
|
14404
|
The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way
[Lewis, by Merricks]
|
5441
|
Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me?
[Mautner on Lewis]
|
7690
|
If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual
[Jacquette on Lewis]
|
5440
|
A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else
[Lewis, by Mautner]
|
15399
|
The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F
[Lewis, by Cameron]
|
9650
|
Supervenience concerns whether things could differ, so it is a modal notion
[Lewis]
|
16133
|
Possible worlds can contain contradictions if such worlds are seen as fictions
[Lewis]
|
16132
|
On mountains or in worlds, reporting contradictions is contradictory, so no such truths can be reported
[Lewis]
|
9651
|
Verisimilitude might be explained as being close to the possible world where the truth is exact
[Lewis]
|
9652
|
To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable
[Lewis]
|
9658
|
An explanation tells us how an event was caused
[Lewis]
|
15732
|
Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set
[Lewis]
|
15733
|
Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances
[Lewis]
|
15734
|
If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too
[Lewis]
|
9655
|
Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds
[Lewis]
|
15751
|
Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed?
[Lewis]
|
15735
|
Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them
[Lewis]
|
9656
|
The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy
[Lewis]
|
15737
|
To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role
[Lewis]
|
15741
|
All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties
[Lewis]
|
15742
|
A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic
[Lewis]
|
14996
|
Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity...
[Lewis]
|
15744
|
We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance
[Lewis]
|
15743
|
Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular
[Lewis]
|
9653
|
It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances
[Lewis]
|
15739
|
There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets
[Lewis]
|
10723
|
A property is the set of its actual and possible instances
[Lewis, by Oliver]
|
9657
|
You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it
[Lewis]
|
15750
|
Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity
[Lewis]
|
15749
|
Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates
[Lewis]
|
15748
|
Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes
[Lewis]
|
15745
|
Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common
[Lewis]
|
15746
|
If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle
[Lewis]
|
15747
|
Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be
[Lewis]
|
9654
|
A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property
[Lewis]
|
15736
|
A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true
[Lewis]
|
15738
|
Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds
[Lewis]
|
15731
|
Quantification sometimes commits to 'sets', but sometimes just to pluralities (or 'classes')
[Lewis]
|
15740
|
I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world
[Lewis]
|
15752
|
We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them
[Lewis]
|
10469
|
A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things
[Lewis]
|
9659
|
Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either
[Lewis]
|
8904
|
The Way of Abstraction says an incomplete description of a concrete entity is the complete abstraction
[Lewis]
|
8938
|
The Way of Example compares donkeys and numbers, but what is the difference, and what are numbers?
[Lewis]
|
8901
|
Abstraction is usually explained either by example, or conflation, or abstraction, or negatively
[Lewis]
|
8903
|
Abstracta can be causal: sets can be causes or effects; there can be universal effects; events may be sets
[Lewis]
|
8902
|
If abstractions are non-spatial, then both sets and universals seem to have locations
[Lewis]
|
8905
|
If universals or tropes are parts of things, then abstraction picks out those parts
[Lewis]
|
8906
|
If we can abstract the extrinsic relations and features of objects, abstraction isn't universals or tropes
[Lewis]
|
8907
|
The abstract direction of a line is the equivalence class of it and all lines parallel to it
[Lewis]
|
8908
|
For most sets, the concept of equivalence is too artificial to explain abstraction
[Lewis]
|
8909
|
Abstractions may well be verbal fictions, in which we ignore some features of an object
[Lewis]
|
9660
|
The impossible can be imagined as long as it is a bit vague
[Lewis]
|
16278
|
A particular functional role is what gives content to a thought
[Lewis]
|
16279
|
General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics
[Lewis]
|
9661
|
Induction is just reasonable methods of inferring the unobserved from the observed
[Lewis]
|
16280
|
Often explanaton seeks fundamental laws, rather than causal histories
[Lewis]
|
16274
|
If the well-ordering of a pack of cards was by shuffling, the explanation would make it more surprising
[Lewis]
|
16281
|
Honesty requires philosophical theories we can commit to with our ordinary commonsense
[Lewis]
|
11903
|
Extreme haecceitists could say I might have been a poached egg, but it is too remote to consider
[Lewis, by Mackie,P]
|
13793
|
An essential property is one possessed by all counterparts
[Lewis, by Elder]
|
16283
|
For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself
[Lewis]
|
16282
|
Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been
[Lewis]
|
16284
|
Ersatz worlds represent either through language, or by models, or magically
[Lewis]
|
16286
|
Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing
[Lewis]
|
16287
|
Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together
[Lewis]
|
9662
|
Linguistic possible worlds have problems of inconsistencies, no indiscernibles, and vocabulary
[Lewis]
|
16288
|
Analysis reduces primitives and makes understanding explicit (without adding new knowledge)
[Lewis]
|
16289
|
We can't account for an abstraction as 'from' something if the something doesn't exist
[Lewis]
|
16290
|
I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals
[Lewis]
|
15968
|
Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing
[Lewis]
|
15969
|
Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem
[Lewis]
|
16291
|
In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings
[Lewis]
|
9663
|
A thing 'perdures' if it has separate temporal parts, and 'endures' if it is wholly present at different times
[Lewis]
|
9664
|
Endurance is the wrong account, because things change intrinsic properties like shape
[Lewis]
|
9665
|
There are three responses to the problem that intrinsic shapes do not endure
[Lewis]
|
9666
|
It is quite implausible that the future is unreal, as that would terminate everything
[Lewis]
|
9667
|
Mereological composition is unrestricted: any class of things has a mereological sum
[Lewis]
|
9669
|
There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties
[Lewis]
|
15129
|
Haecceitism implies de re differences but qualitative identity
[Lewis]
|
9670
|
Extreme haecceitism says you might possibly be a poached egg
[Lewis]
|
9057
|
Vagueness is semantic indecision: we haven't settled quite what our words are meant to express
[Lewis]
|
9671
|
Whether or not France is hexagonal depends on your standards of precision
[Lewis]
|
19280
|
I can ask questions which create a context in which origin ceases to be essential
[Lewis]
|
14737
|
Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic
[Lewis, by Sider]
|
13268
|
There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague
[Lewis, by Sider]
|
16262
|
Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness
[Lewis, by Maudlin]
|
15397
|
If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic
[Cameron on Lewis]
|
15398
|
Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic
[Cameron on Lewis]
|