more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
I identify propositions with properties that are instantiated only by entire possible worlds. If properties are the sets of their instances, a proposition is a set of possible worlds. A proposition is the property of being a world where it holds.
Gist of Idea
A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true
Source
David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5)
Book Ref
Lewis,David: 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [Blackwell 2001], p.53
A Reaction
This is so far away from my concept of a proposition (as a truth-evaluable representational mental event) that I struggle to compute it. So the proposition that I am sitting here is the property of 'being the actual world'. Eh?
Related Idea
Idea 15738 Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds [Lewis]
| 23486 | Pictures are possible situations in logical space [Wittgenstein] |
| 4897 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry] |
| 8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
| 9654 | A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property [Lewis] |
| 15736 | A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true [Lewis] |
| 15738 | Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds [Lewis] |
| 7002 | If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values [Heil] |
| 21624 | It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds [Williamson] |
| 18001 | Are there partial propositions, lacking truth value in some possible worlds? [Magidor] |