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Full Idea
To deserve the name of 'property' is to be suited to play the right theoretical role. It is wrong to speak of 'the' role associated with the word 'property', as if it were fully and uncontroversially settled.
Gist of Idea
To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role
Source
David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5)
Book Ref
Lewis,David: 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [Blackwell 2001], p.55
A Reaction
Once again I see a chicken-and-egg problem. Surely something has a theoretical role because of its intrinsic character, or its prior definition? How could you formulate a theory if you lacked properties? We don’t meet properties as gaps in theories.
| 16155 | Aristotle promoted the importance of properties and objects (rather than general and particular) [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 17849 | For two things to differ in some respect, they must both possess that respect [Aristotle] |
| 15754 | Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
| 18372 | We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong] |
| 8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |
| 15737 | To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role [Lewis] |
| 10716 | There are just as many properties as the laws require [Oliver] |
| 18510 | We need properties to explain how the world works [Heil] |
| 18430 | We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards] |