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Full Idea
If it is central to 'proposition' that there be quasi-syntactic structure, so that there are subject-predicate, or negative, or conjunctive, or quantified propositions, then sets of possible worlds will not do.
Gist of Idea
Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds
Source
David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5)
Book Ref
Lewis,David: 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [Blackwell 2001], p.57
A Reaction
He proposes 'more complicated set-theoretic constructions out of possibilia' instead. I am very much committed to propositions having quasi-syntactic structure.
| 23486 | Pictures are possible situations in logical space [Wittgenstein] |
| 4897 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry] |
| 8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
| 9654 | A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property [Lewis] |
| 15736 | A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true [Lewis] |
| 15738 | Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds [Lewis] |
| 7002 | If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values [Heil] |
| 21624 | It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds [Williamson] |
| 18001 | Are there partial propositions, lacking truth value in some possible worlds? [Magidor] |