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Full Idea
It cannot be said that a universal is instantiated by anything that has it as a part, since the relation of part to whole is transitive. If charge is part of a particle, which is part of an atom, then charge is part of the atom, but an atom isn't charged.
Gist of Idea
Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be
Source
David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5)
Book Ref
Lewis,David: 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [Blackwell 2001], p.65
A Reaction
Given the total mystery involved in 'instantiation', it wouldn't surprise me if someone appealed to the part-whole relation, but all moves to explain instantiation are desperate. Make it a primitive, if you must, then tiptoe away.
| 11037 | Colour must be in an individual body, or it is not embodied [Aristotle] |
| 12094 | No universals exist separately from particulars [Aristotle] |
| 17677 | Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong] |
| 17686 | Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong] |
| 15442 | Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 15747 | Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be [Lewis] |
| 10724 | Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place [Oliver] |
| 7963 | Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects [Oliver] |
| 10730 | If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals? [Oliver] |
| 4454 | The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars [Moreland] |
| 10197 | An immanent universal is wholly present in more than one place [Zimmerman,DW] |
| 9486 | Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular? [Bird] |