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Single Idea 15748
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
]
Full Idea
Trope theory needs a primitive notion - 'instantion' in yet another sense - to say how the tropes that comprise a particle are united.
Gist of Idea
Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes
Source
David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5)
Book Ref
Lewis,David: 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [Blackwell 2001], p.65
A Reaction
Any theory which says that objects are just 'bundles' of tropes is asking for trouble. But if you say (with Lowe and others) that tropes are 'modes' of existing entities, you still have to give an account of the entity.
The
324 ideas
from David Lewis
16456
|
For modality Lewis rejected boxes and diamonds, preferring worlds, and an index for the actual one
[Lewis, by Stalnaker]
|
18415
|
The actual world is just the world you are in
[Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever]
|
16392
|
A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property
[Lewis, by Recanati]
|
16390
|
Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time
[Lewis, by Recanati]
|
18416
|
Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties
[Lewis, by Solomon]
|
18418
|
A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent
[Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever]
|
4809
|
Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation
[Lewis, by Psillos]
|
15551
|
Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right'
[Lewis]
|
15552
|
We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry.
[Lewis]
|
15553
|
Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events
[Lewis]
|
14321
|
To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history
[Lewis]
|
15554
|
A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property?
[Lewis]
|
15556
|
Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws
[Lewis]
|
15555
|
Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match
[Lewis]
|
15558
|
A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen
[Lewis]
|
15559
|
Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty
[Lewis]
|
15557
|
Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components
[Lewis]
|
15560
|
We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur
[Lewis]
|
9476
|
If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them
[Bird on Lewis]
|
17525
|
The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects
[Lewis, by Bird]
|
10392
|
It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause
[Lewis]
|
17524
|
Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption)
[Lewis, by Bird]
|
8397
|
Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't
[Tooley on Lewis]
|
4795
|
Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter
[Cohen,LJ on Lewis]
|
8405
|
A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted
[Lewis, by Field,H]
|
8419
|
The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions
[Lewis]
|
8420
|
A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true
[Lewis]
|
8421
|
Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted
[Lewis]
|
8423
|
My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations
[Lewis]
|
8424
|
Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ
[Lewis]
|
8425
|
For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality
[Lewis]
|
8426
|
One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second
[Lewis]
|
8427
|
I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted
[Lewis]
|
14399
|
Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on
[Lewis]
|
15546
|
Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists
[Lewis]
|
15545
|
Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions
[Lewis]
|
15548
|
Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly
[Lewis]
|
15543
|
How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine
[Lewis]
|
8433
|
There are few traces of an event before it happens, but many afterwards
[Lewis, by Horwich]
|
8434
|
In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true
[Lewis, by Horwich]
|
14361
|
Lewis says indicative conditionals are truth-functional
[Lewis, by Jackson]
|
9419
|
A law of nature is a general axiom of the deductive system that is best for simplicity and strength
[Lewis]
|
16994
|
Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart
[Kripke on Lewis]
|
11974
|
Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do
[Lewis]
|
11975
|
If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart
[Lewis]
|
11977
|
Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts
[Lewis]
|
11976
|
Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification
[Lewis]
|
11979
|
It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election
[Lewis]
|
11978
|
Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature
[Lewis]
|
15400
|
We must avoid circularity between what is intrinsic and what is natural
[Lewis, by Cameron]
|
15458
|
A property is 'intrinsic' iff it can never differ between duplicates
[Lewis]
|
15457
|
Interdefinition is useless by itself, but if we grasp one separately, we have them both
[Lewis]
|
15459
|
Ellipsoidal stars seem to have an intrinsic property which depends on other objects
[Lewis]
|
15527
|
Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination
[Lewis]
|
15526
|
There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand
[Lewis]
|
15528
|
A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what
[Lewis]
|
15529
|
It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible
[Lewis]
|
15530
|
A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world
[Lewis]
|
15531
|
The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation
[Lewis]
|
12898
|
Justification is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge
[Lewis]
|
12895
|
Knowing is context-sensitive because the domain of quantification varies
[Lewis, by Cohen,S]
|
19562
|
We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context
[Lewis, by Cohen,S]
|
12897
|
To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction
[Lewis]
|
12899
|
The timid student has knowledge without belief, lacking confidence in their correct answer
[Lewis]
|
15562
|
Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence
[Lewis]
|
15561
|
The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation
[Lewis]
|
15564
|
An event is a property of a unique space-time region
[Lewis]
|
15563
|
Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables
[Lewis]
|
15565
|
Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence
[Lewis]
|
15566
|
Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts
[Lewis]
|
15567
|
Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges
[Lewis]
|
14979
|
Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic
[Lewis, by Sider]
|
15454
|
Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling'
[Lewis]
|
15455
|
Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is
[Lewis]
|
15461
|
A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs
[Lewis]
|
15462
|
Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents
[Lewis]
|
15463
|
All dispositions must have causal bases
[Lewis]
|
15464
|
The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion
[Lewis]
|
7441
|
Experiences are defined by their causal role, and causal roles belong to physical states
[Lewis]
|
7442
|
'Pain' contingently names the state that occupies the causal role of pain
[Lewis]
|
10847
|
Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth
[Lewis]
|
10845
|
To be true a sentence must express a proposition, and not be ambiguous or vague or just expressive
[Lewis]
|
10846
|
Truthmaker is correspondence, but without the requirement to be one-to-one
[Lewis]
|
21461
|
I tried to be unsystematic and piecemeal, but failed; my papers presuppose my other views
[Lewis]
|
9426
|
The world is just a vast mosaic of little matters of local particular fact
[Lewis]
|
16210
|
Humean supervenience says the world is just a vast mosaic of qualities in space-time
[Lewis]
|
7443
|
A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia
[Lewis, by PG]
|
7444
|
Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain
[Lewis]
|
7445
|
The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent
[Lewis]
|
15539
|
Basic to pragmatics is taking a message in a way that makes sense of it
[Lewis]
|
15537
|
If cats are vague, we deny that the many cats are one, or deny that the one cat is many
[Lewis]
|
15536
|
We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it
[Lewis]
|
15538
|
Semantic indecision explains vagueness (if we have precisifications to be undecided about)
[Lewis]
|
8209
|
Part of the folk concept of qualia is what makes recognition and comparison possible
[Lewis]
|
10808
|
Mathematics is generalisations about singleton functions
[Lewis]
|
10807
|
Mathematics reduces to set theory, which reduces, with some mereology, to the singleton function
[Lewis]
|
10806
|
Megethology is the result of adding plural quantification to mereology
[Lewis]
|
10809
|
We can accept the null set, but not a null class, a class lacking members
[Lewis]
|
10810
|
I say that absolutely any things can have a mereological fusion
[Lewis]
|
10812
|
The null set is not a little speck of sheer nothingness, a black hole in Reality
[Lewis]
|
10811
|
The null set plays the role of last resort, for class abstracts and for existence
[Lewis]
|
10813
|
What on earth is the relationship between a singleton and an element?
[Lewis]
|
10814
|
Are all singletons exact intrinsic duplicates?
[Lewis]
|
10815
|
We don't need 'abstract structures' to have structural truths about successor functions
[Lewis]
|
10816
|
We can use mereology to simulate quantification over relations
[Lewis]
|
15532
|
'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones
[Lewis]
|
15534
|
We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties
[Lewis]
|
15533
|
We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names
[Lewis]
|
15535
|
We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist
[Lewis]
|
15452
|
We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures
[Lewis]
|
15453
|
The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory
[Lewis]
|
3989
|
I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything
[Lewis]
|
3990
|
The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth
[Lewis]
|
3991
|
Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction
[Lewis]
|
3992
|
Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles
[Lewis]
|
3993
|
Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe
[Lewis]
|
3994
|
Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else
[Lewis]
|
3995
|
A mind is an organ of representation
[Lewis]
|
3996
|
Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought
[Lewis]
|
3998
|
If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs
[Lewis]
|
3997
|
Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority
[Lewis]
|
3999
|
A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs
[Lewis]
|
4000
|
Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things
[Lewis]
|
14404
|
The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way
[Lewis, by Merricks]
|
5441
|
Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me?
[Mautner on Lewis]
|
5440
|
A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else
[Lewis, by Mautner]
|
7690
|
If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual
[Jacquette on Lewis]
|
16441
|
Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets
[Lewis, by Stalnaker]
|
12255
|
For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual
[Oderberg on Lewis]
|
9219
|
Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets
[Lewis, by Sider]
|
15022
|
If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality
[Sider on Lewis]
|
10470
|
There are only two kinds: sets, and possibilia (actual and possible particulars)
[Lewis, by Oliver]
|
15399
|
The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F
[Lewis, by Cameron]
|
9650
|
Supervenience concerns whether things could differ, so it is a modal notion
[Lewis]
|
16132
|
On mountains or in worlds, reporting contradictions is contradictory, so no such truths can be reported
[Lewis]
|
16133
|
Possible worlds can contain contradictions if such worlds are seen as fictions
[Lewis]
|
9651
|
Verisimilitude might be explained as being close to the possible world where the truth is exact
[Lewis]
|
9652
|
To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable
[Lewis]
|
9658
|
An explanation tells us how an event was caused
[Lewis]
|
15732
|
Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set
[Lewis]
|
15733
|
Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances
[Lewis]
|
15734
|
If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too
[Lewis]
|
9655
|
Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds
[Lewis]
|
9657
|
You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it
[Lewis]
|
15749
|
Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates
[Lewis]
|
15750
|
Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity
[Lewis]
|
15748
|
Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes
[Lewis]
|
15739
|
There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets
[Lewis]
|
10723
|
A property is the set of its actual and possible instances
[Lewis, by Oliver]
|
15746
|
If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle
[Lewis]
|
15747
|
Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be
[Lewis]
|
15745
|
Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common
[Lewis]
|
9653
|
It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances
[Lewis]
|
15751
|
Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed?
[Lewis]
|
15735
|
Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them
[Lewis]
|
9656
|
The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy
[Lewis]
|
15737
|
To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role
[Lewis]
|
15742
|
A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic
[Lewis]
|
15741
|
All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties
[Lewis]
|
14996
|
Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity...
[Lewis]
|
15744
|
We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance
[Lewis]
|
15743
|
Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular
[Lewis]
|
9654
|
A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property
[Lewis]
|
15736
|
A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true
[Lewis]
|
15738
|
Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds
[Lewis]
|
15731
|
Quantification sometimes commits to 'sets', but sometimes just to pluralities (or 'classes')
[Lewis]
|
15740
|
I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world
[Lewis]
|
15752
|
We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them
[Lewis]
|
9659
|
Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either
[Lewis]
|
10469
|
A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things
[Lewis]
|
8901
|
Abstraction is usually explained either by example, or conflation, or abstraction, or negatively
[Lewis]
|
8904
|
The Way of Abstraction says an incomplete description of a concrete entity is the complete abstraction
[Lewis]
|
8938
|
The Way of Example compares donkeys and numbers, but what is the difference, and what are numbers?
[Lewis]
|
8903
|
Abstracta can be causal: sets can be causes or effects; there can be universal effects; events may be sets
[Lewis]
|
8902
|
If abstractions are non-spatial, then both sets and universals seem to have locations
[Lewis]
|
8906
|
If we can abstract the extrinsic relations and features of objects, abstraction isn't universals or tropes
[Lewis]
|
8905
|
If universals or tropes are parts of things, then abstraction picks out those parts
[Lewis]
|
8908
|
For most sets, the concept of equivalence is too artificial to explain abstraction
[Lewis]
|
8907
|
The abstract direction of a line is the equivalence class of it and all lines parallel to it
[Lewis]
|
8909
|
Abstractions may well be verbal fictions, in which we ignore some features of an object
[Lewis]
|
9660
|
The impossible can be imagined as long as it is a bit vague
[Lewis]
|
16278
|
A particular functional role is what gives content to a thought
[Lewis]
|
16279
|
General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics
[Lewis]
|
9661
|
Induction is just reasonable methods of inferring the unobserved from the observed
[Lewis]
|
16274
|
If the well-ordering of a pack of cards was by shuffling, the explanation would make it more surprising
[Lewis]
|
16280
|
Often explanaton seeks fundamental laws, rather than causal histories
[Lewis]
|
16281
|
Honesty requires philosophical theories we can commit to with our ordinary commonsense
[Lewis]
|
11903
|
Extreme haecceitists could say I might have been a poached egg, but it is too remote to consider
[Lewis, by Mackie,P]
|
13793
|
An essential property is one possessed by all counterparts
[Lewis, by Elder]
|
16283
|
For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself
[Lewis]
|
16282
|
Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been
[Lewis]
|
16284
|
Ersatz worlds represent either through language, or by models, or magically
[Lewis]
|
16286
|
Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing
[Lewis]
|
16287
|
Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together
[Lewis]
|
9662
|
Linguistic possible worlds have problems of inconsistencies, no indiscernibles, and vocabulary
[Lewis]
|
16288
|
Analysis reduces primitives and makes understanding explicit (without adding new knowledge)
[Lewis]
|
16289
|
We can't account for an abstraction as 'from' something if the something doesn't exist
[Lewis]
|
16290
|
I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals
[Lewis]
|
15968
|
Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing
[Lewis]
|
16291
|
In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings
[Lewis]
|
15969
|
Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem
[Lewis]
|
9666
|
It is quite implausible that the future is unreal, as that would terminate everything
[Lewis]
|
9663
|
A thing 'perdures' if it has separate temporal parts, and 'endures' if it is wholly present at different times
[Lewis]
|
9664
|
Endurance is the wrong account, because things change intrinsic properties like shape
[Lewis]
|
9665
|
There are three responses to the problem that intrinsic shapes do not endure
[Lewis]
|
9667
|
Mereological composition is unrestricted: any class of things has a mereological sum
[Lewis]
|
15129
|
Haecceitism implies de re differences but qualitative identity
[Lewis]
|
9670
|
Extreme haecceitism says you might possibly be a poached egg
[Lewis]
|
9669
|
There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties
[Lewis]
|
9057
|
Vagueness is semantic indecision: we haven't settled quite what our words are meant to express
[Lewis]
|
9671
|
Whether or not France is hexagonal depends on your standards of precision
[Lewis]
|
19280
|
I can ask questions which create a context in which origin ceases to be essential
[Lewis]
|
14737
|
Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic
[Lewis, by Sider]
|
13268
|
There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague
[Lewis, by Sider]
|
16262
|
Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness
[Lewis, by Maudlin]
|
15398
|
Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic
[Cameron on Lewis]
|
15397
|
If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic
[Cameron on Lewis]
|
23019
|
The interesting time travel is when personal and external time come apart
[Lewis, by Baron/Miller]
|
23021
|
Lewis said it might just be that travellers to the past can't kill their grandfathers
[Lewis, by Baron/Miller]
|
10191
|
Set theory reduces to a mereological theory with singletons as the only atoms
[Lewis, by MacBride]
|
18395
|
Sets are mereological sums of the singletons of their members
[Lewis, by Armstrong]
|
10566
|
Lewis prefers giving up singletons to giving up sums
[Lewis, by Fine,K]
|
14244
|
Lewis only uses fusions to create unities, but fusions notoriously flatten our distinctions
[Oliver/Smiley on Lewis]
|
15496
|
We can build set theory on singletons: classes are then fusions of subclasses, membership is the singleton
[Lewis]
|
15497
|
We can replace the membership relation with the member-singleton relation (plus mereology)
[Lewis]
|
15498
|
We can accept the null set, but there is no null class of anything
[Lewis]
|
15500
|
Classes divide into subclasses in many ways, but into members in only one way
[Lewis]
|
15499
|
A subclass of a subclass is itself a subclass; a member of a member is not in general a member
[Lewis]
|
15501
|
We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture
[Lewis]
|
15502
|
There are four main reasons for asserting that there is an empty set
[Lewis]
|
15503
|
We needn't accept this speck of nothingness, this black hole in the fabric of Reality!
[Lewis]
|
15504
|
Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts
[Lewis]
|
15506
|
If we don't understand the singleton, then we don't understand classes
[Lewis]
|
15508
|
If singletons are where their members are, then so are all sets
[Lewis]
|
15507
|
Set theory has some unofficial axioms, generalisations about how to understand it
[Lewis]
|
15509
|
Some say qualities are parts of things - as repeatable universals, or as particulars
[Lewis]
|
15511
|
If singleton membership is external, why is an object a member of one rather than another?
[Lewis]
|
15512
|
In mereology no two things consist of the same atoms
[Lewis]
|
15513
|
Maybe singletons have a structure, of a thing and a lasso?
[Lewis]
|
15514
|
A huge part of Reality is only accepted as existing if you have accepted set theory
[Lewis]
|
15515
|
To be a structuralist, you quantify over relations
[Lewis]
|
15516
|
A property is any class of possibilia
[Lewis]
|
15517
|
Giving up classes means giving up successful mathematics because of dubious philosophy
[Lewis]
|
15518
|
I like plural quantification, but am not convinced of its connection with second-order logic
[Lewis]
|
15520
|
Existence doesn't come in degrees; once asserted, it can't then be qualified
[Lewis]
|
15519
|
Trout-turkeys exist, despite lacking cohesion, natural joints and united causal power
[Lewis]
|
15521
|
Given cats, a fusion of cats adds nothing further to reality
[Lewis]
|
15522
|
The one has different truths from the many; it is one rather than many, one rather than six
[Lewis]
|
14748
|
The many are many and the one is one, so they can't be identical
[Lewis]
|
15523
|
Set theory isn't innocent; it generates infinities from a single thing; but mathematics needs it
[Lewis]
|
15524
|
Zermelo's model of arithmetic is distinctive because it rests on a primitive of set theory
[Lewis]
|
15525
|
Plural quantification lacks a complete axiom system
[Lewis]
|
10660
|
A commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment; it is them and they are it
[Lewis]
|
6129
|
Lewis affirms 'composition as identity' - that an object is no more than its parts
[Lewis, by Merricks]
|
15790
|
Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible
[Lycan on Lewis]
|
15791
|
What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds?
[Lycan on Lewis]
|
15789
|
Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting'
[Lycan on Lewis]
|
14283
|
A conditional probability does not measure the probability of the truth of any proposition
[Lewis, by Edgington]
|
4038
|
Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate')
[Lewis, by Mellor/Oliver]
|
9409
|
Laws are the best axiomatization of the total history of world events or facts
[Lewis, by Mumford]
|
9423
|
If simplicity and strength are criteria for laws of nature, that introduces a subjective element
[Mumford on Lewis]
|
9424
|
A number of systematizations might tie as the best and most coherent system
[Mumford on Lewis]
|
14209
|
Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications)
[Lewis]
|
14215
|
Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy
[Lewis]
|
14210
|
A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints
[Lewis]
|
14213
|
Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth
[Lewis]
|
14212
|
A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those
[Lewis]
|
15540
|
You can't deny temporary intrinsic properties by saying the properties are relations (to times)
[Lewis]
|
15433
|
Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates
[Lewis]
|
15448
|
The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts
[Lewis]
|
15449
|
If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals
[Lewis]
|
15439
|
The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts
[Lewis]
|
15441
|
The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over
[Lewis]
|
15440
|
A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology
[Lewis]
|
15443
|
Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one
[Lewis]
|
15450
|
Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction
[Lewis]
|
15451
|
I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world
[Lewis]
|
15444
|
Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times
[Lewis]
|
15446
|
Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples
[Lewis]
|
15445
|
Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures
[Lewis]
|
15434
|
Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts
[Lewis]
|
15437
|
We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals
[Lewis]
|
15436
|
Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance
[Lewis]
|
15438
|
We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism
[Lewis]
|
15435
|
If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate
[Lewis]
|
9425
|
Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few)
[Mumford on Lewis]
|
16079
|
De re modal predicates are ambiguous
[Lewis, by Rudder Baker]
|
14401
|
Every proposition is entirely about being
[Lewis]
|
15549
|
If it were true that nothing at all existed, would that have a truthmaker?
[Lewis]
|
10717
|
Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects
[Lewis, by Oliver]
|
7031
|
Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects
[Lewis, by Heil]
|
16217
|
Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity
[Lewis, by Hawley]
|
21961
|
Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist
[Lewis, by Moore,AW]
|
15120
|
Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties
[Lewis, by Hawthorne]
|
14499
|
Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars
[Lewis, by Koslicki]
|
8576
|
The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches)
[Lewis]
|
8605
|
In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive
[Lewis]
|
8585
|
Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties
[Lewis]
|
8613
|
Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated
[Lewis]
|
8586
|
Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains
[Lewis]
|
8589
|
For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes
[Lewis]
|
8615
|
We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity
[Lewis]
|
8614
|
A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth
[Lewis]
|
8607
|
Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability
[Lewis]
|
8606
|
A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation
[Lewis]
|
8608
|
Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past
[Lewis]
|
15727
|
Physics aims for a list of natural properties
[Lewis]
|
8569
|
I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done
[Lewis]
|
8584
|
Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption
[Lewis]
|
8611
|
A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system
[Lewis]
|
8581
|
Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required
[Lewis]
|
8580
|
Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically
[Lewis]
|
8579
|
Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism
[Lewis]
|
15460
|
All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic
[Lewis, by Lewis]
|
15726
|
Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals
[Lewis]
|
8572
|
Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant
[Lewis]
|
8571
|
Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around
[Lewis]
|
8570
|
To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things
[Lewis]
|
18433
|
There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify
[Lewis]
|
8604
|
We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions
[Lewis]
|
8573
|
Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones.
[Lewis]
|
8574
|
Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same
[Lewis]
|
16458
|
Semantic vagueness involves alternative and equal precisifications of the language
[Lewis]
|
4398
|
An event causes another just if the second event would not have happened without the first
[Lewis, by Psillos]
|