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Full Idea
The ontological correlates of true law-statements must involve properties. How else can one pick our the uniformities which the law-statements entail?
Gist of Idea
Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature
Source
David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], 1)
Book Ref
'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.165
A Reaction
I'm unconvinced about the 'laws', but I have to admit that it is hard to know how to describe the relevant bits of nature without some family of concepts covered by the word 'property'. I'm in favour of taking some of the family into care, though.
| 16155 | Aristotle promoted the importance of properties and objects (rather than general and particular) [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 17849 | For two things to differ in some respect, they must both possess that respect [Aristotle] |
| 15754 | Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
| 18372 | We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong] |
| 8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |
| 15737 | To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role [Lewis] |
| 10716 | There are just as many properties as the laws require [Oliver] |
| 18510 | We need properties to explain how the world works [Heil] |
| 18430 | We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards] |