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Single Idea 15754
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
]
Full Idea
The ontological correlates of true law-statements must involve properties. How else can one pick our the uniformities which the law-statements entail?
Gist of Idea
Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature
Source
David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], 1)
Book Ref
'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.165
A Reaction
I'm unconvinced about the 'laws', but I have to admit that it is hard to know how to describe the relevant bits of nature without some family of concepts covered by the word 'property'. I'm in favour of taking some of the family into care, though.
The
17 ideas
from 'Properties'
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4036
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What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities
[Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver]
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8533
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Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply
[Armstrong]
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4035
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There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects
[Armstrong]
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4034
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Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature
[Armstrong]
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8535
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To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate
[Armstrong]
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8529
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Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes
[Armstrong]
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8532
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Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties
[Armstrong]
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8530
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Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold'
[Armstrong]
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8536
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We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates
[Armstrong]
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8531
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In most sets there is no property common to all the members
[Armstrong]
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8537
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Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive
[Armstrong]
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8538
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Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact
[Armstrong]
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8539
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Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature
[Armstrong]
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8541
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Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability
[Armstrong]
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8540
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The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue'
[Armstrong]
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15754
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Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature
[Armstrong]
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15753
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Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined
[Armstrong]
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