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Single Idea 15765
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
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Full Idea
I should probably modify my view, and say that properties are individuated by their possible causes as well as by their possible effects.
Gist of Idea
Actually, properties are individuated by causes as well as effects
Source
Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §11)
Book Ref
Shoemaker,Sydney: 'Identity, Cause and Mind' [OUP 2003], p.233
A Reaction
(This is in an afterword responding to criticism by Richard Boyd) He doesn't use the word 'individuate' in the essay. That term always strikes me as smacking too much of epistemology, and not enough of ontology. Who cares how you individuate something?
The
33 ideas
from 'Causality and Properties'
9485
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Universals concern how things are, and how they could be
[Shoemaker, by Bird]
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12678
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Shoemaker says all genuine properties are dispositional
[Shoemaker, by Ellis]
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8542
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If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved
[Shoemaker]
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8543
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Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes
[Shoemaker]
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8545
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A causal theory of properties focuses on change, not (say) on abstract properties of numbers
[Shoemaker]
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15756
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Some truths are not because of a thing's properties, but because of the properties of related things
[Shoemaker]
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15758
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Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties
[Shoemaker]
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8547
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One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties
[Shoemaker]
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15757
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'Square', 'round' and 'made of copper' show that not all properties are dispositional
[Shoemaker]
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8548
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Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties
[Shoemaker]
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8550
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Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same
[Shoemaker]
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15761
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We should abandon the idea that properties are the meanings of predicate expressions
[Shoemaker]
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15759
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The identity of a property concerns its causal powers
[Shoemaker]
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15760
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Properties are clusters of conditional powers
[Shoemaker]
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8549
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Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects
[Shoemaker]
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15762
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Could properties change without the powers changing, or powers change without the properties changing?
[Shoemaker]
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8552
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If properties are separated from causal powers, this invites total elimination
[Shoemaker]
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8551
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Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them
[Shoemaker]
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8555
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There is no subset of properties which guarantee a thing's identity
[Shoemaker]
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8554
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Possible difference across worlds depends on difference across time in the actual world
[Shoemaker]
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8553
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It looks as if the immutability of the powers of a property imply essentiality
[Shoemaker]
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8557
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To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly
[Shoemaker]
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8556
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Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential
[Shoemaker]
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4040
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The notions of property and of causal power are parts of a single system of related concepts
[Shoemaker]
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8558
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One system has properties, powers, events, similarity and substance
[Shoemaker]
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8559
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Analysis aims at internal relationships, not reduction
[Shoemaker]
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8560
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If causal laws describe causal potentialities, the same laws govern properties in all possible worlds
[Shoemaker]
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15763
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If properties are causal, then causal necessity is a species of logical necessity
[Shoemaker]
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8561
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If a world has different causal laws, it must have different properties
[Shoemaker]
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15764
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'Conceivable' is either not-provably-false, or compatible with what we know?
[Shoemaker]
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8562
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It is possible to conceive what is not possible
[Shoemaker]
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15765
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Actually, properties are individuated by causes as well as effects
[Shoemaker]
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15092
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Formerly I said properties are individuated by essential causal powers and causing instantiation
[Shoemaker, by Shoemaker]
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