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Single Idea 15791

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism ]

Full Idea

Lewis must seek some ontological ground for the grouping of possibilia into disjoint worlds.

Gist of Idea

What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds?

Source

comment on David Lewis (Possible Worlds [1973]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 07

Book Ref

'The Possible and the Actual', ed/tr. Loux,Michael J. [Cornell 1979], p.297


A Reaction

I do love people like Lycan who ask the simple commonsense questions about these highly sophisticated systems that students of philosophy are required to study. If a proposition is a 'set of worlds', understanding a proposition is beyond me.


The 13 ideas with the same theme [proposal that only our actual world exists]:

The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce]
The best version of reductionist actualism around is Armstrong's combinatorial account [Armstrong, by Read]
Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions [Plantinga, by Armstrong]
Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins]
The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever]
Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Lewis, by Stalnaker]
Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been [Lewis]
What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis]
Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis]
Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read]
Serious Actualism says there are no facts at all about something which doesn't exist [Simchen]