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Full Idea
Meinong's Objects have sometimes been construed as sets of properties.
Gist of Idea
Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties
Source
William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 09)
Book Ref
'The Possible and the Actual', ed/tr. Loux,Michael J. [Cornell 1979], p.302
A Reaction
[Lycan cites Castaņeda and T.Parsons] You still seem to have the problem with any 'bundle' theory of anything. A non-existent object is as much intended to be an object as anything on my desk right now. It just fails to be.
15787 | Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan] |
15784 | The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan] |
15792 | Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan] |
15795 | Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan] |
15794 | If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan] |
15796 | Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan] |