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Full Idea
A mentalistic approach to possible worlds is daunted by the paucity of actual mental events.
Gist of Idea
Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events
Source
William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 09)
Book Ref
'The Possible and the Actual', ed/tr. Loux,Michael J. [Cornell 1979], p.304
A Reaction
Why do they have to be actual, any more than memories have to be conscious? The mental events just need to be available when you need them. They are never all required simultaneously. This isn't mathematical logic!
| 15787 | Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan] |
| 15784 | The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan] |
| 15792 | Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan] |
| 15795 | Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan] |
| 15794 | If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan] |
| 15796 | Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan] |