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Single Idea 15804
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
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Full Idea
The state of affairs which is some dogs being brown may be said to entail (make it necessarily so) the property of 'being brown', as well as the properties of 'being canine' and 'being both brown and canine'.
Gist of Idea
If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine'
Source
Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.4)
Book Ref
Chisholm,Roderick: 'Person and Object' [Open Court 1976], p.28
A Reaction
And the property of 'being such that it is both brown and canine and brown or canine'. Etc. This is dangerous nonsense. Making all truths entail the existence of some property means we can no longer get to grips with real properties.
The
32 ideas
from 'Person and Object'
15801
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Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves
[Chisholm]
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15802
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I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout
[Chisholm]
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15803
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Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process
[Chisholm]
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15804
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If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine'
[Chisholm]
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15805
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Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity
[Chisholm]
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15807
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A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity
[Chisholm]
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15809
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A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property
[Chisholm]
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15808
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A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics
[Chisholm]
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15806
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The property of being identical with me is an individual concept
[Chisholm]
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15810
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Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves
[Chisholm]
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15813
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People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence
[Chisholm]
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15811
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I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself'
[Chisholm]
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15814
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A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities
[Chisholm]
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15815
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Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent'
[Chisholm]
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15819
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Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter?
[Chisholm]
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15816
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'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book'
[Chisholm]
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15818
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So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them
[Chisholm]
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15817
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If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'?
[Chisholm]
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15820
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A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary
[Chisholm]
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15821
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Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition
[Chisholm]
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15822
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The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature
[Chisholm]
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15823
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Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation'
[Chisholm]
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15824
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There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission'
[Chisholm]
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15826
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There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ
[Chisholm]
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15827
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Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had'
[Chisholm]
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15828
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I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs
[Chisholm]
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15830
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Some properties can never be had, like being a round square
[Chisholm]
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15829
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The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted
[Chisholm]
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15831
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Explanations have states of affairs as their objects
[Chisholm]
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15832
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Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times
[Chisholm]
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12852
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If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists
[Chisholm, by Simons]
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12851
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Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks
[Chisholm, by Simons]
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