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Single Idea 15821

[filed under theme 16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will ]

Full Idea

Determinism is the proposition that, for every event that occurs, there occurs a sufficient causal condition of that event.

Gist of Idea

Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition

Source

Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 2.2)

Book Ref

Chisholm,Roderick: 'Person and Object' [Open Court 1976], p.59

A Reaction

You need an ontology of events to put it precisely this way. Doesn't it also work the other way: that there is an event for every sufficient causal condition? The beginning and the end of reality pose problems.

The 45 ideas from Roderick Chisholm

9268 If free will miraculously interrupts causation, animals might do that; why would we want to do it? [Frankfurt on Chisholm]
3442 Responsibility seems to conflict with events being either caused or not caused [Chisholm]
3443 Desires may rule us, but are we responsible for our desires? [Chisholm]
3445 Causation among objects relates either events or states [Chisholm]
3444 If actions are not caused by other events, and are not causeless, they must be caused by the person [Chisholm]
3446 For Hobbes (but not for Kant) a person's actions can be deduced from their desires and beliefs [Chisholm]
20062 If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong [Chisholm]
20054 There has to be a brain event which is not caused by another event, but by the agent [Chisholm]
11965 Could possible Adam gradually transform into Noah, and vice versa? [Chisholm]
11966 If there are essential properties, how do you find out what they are? [Chisholm]
8790 The 'doctrine of the given' is correct; some beliefs or statements are self-justifying [Chisholm]
15801 Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves [Chisholm]
15802 I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout [Chisholm]
15803 Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process [Chisholm]
15808 A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics [Chisholm]
15806 The property of being identical with me is an individual concept [Chisholm]
15809 A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property [Chisholm]
15805 Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity [Chisholm]
15807 A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity [Chisholm]
15804 If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine' [Chisholm]
15810 Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves [Chisholm]
15811 I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself' [Chisholm]
15813 People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence [Chisholm]
15814 A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities [Chisholm]
15815 Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent' [Chisholm]
15819 Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter? [Chisholm]
15816 'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book' [Chisholm]
15817 If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'? [Chisholm]
15818 So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them [Chisholm]
15821 Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition [Chisholm]
15820 A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary [Chisholm]
15822 The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature [Chisholm]
15823 Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation' [Chisholm]
15824 There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission' [Chisholm]
15826 There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ [Chisholm]
15827 Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had' [Chisholm]
15828 I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs [Chisholm]
15830 Some properties can never be had, like being a round square [Chisholm]
15829 The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted [Chisholm]
15831 Explanations have states of affairs as their objects [Chisholm]
15832 Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times [Chisholm]
12852 If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists [Chisholm, by Simons]
12851 Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks [Chisholm, by Simons]
13120 Chisholm divides things into contingent and necessary, and then individuals, states and non-states [Chisholm, by Westerhoff]
19569 We have a basic epistemic duty to believe truth and avoid error [Chisholm, by Kvanvig]