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Full Idea
I suggest that there is a 'loose' sense of identity that is consistent with saying 'A has a property that B does not have', or 'some things are true of A but not of B'.
Gist of Idea
There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ
Source
Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 3.2)
Book Ref
Chisholm,Roderick: 'Person and Object' [Open Court 1976], p.92
A Reaction
He is trying to explicate Bishop Butler's famous distinction between 'strict and philosophical' and 'loose and popular' senses. We might want to claim that the genuine identity relation is the 'loose' one (pace the logicians and mathematicians).
Related Idea
| 12266 | 'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle] |
| 12287 | Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle] |
| 12288 | Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle] |
| 8650 | Things are the same if one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth [Leibniz] |
| 21315 | A tree remains the same in the popular sense, but not in the strict philosophical sense [Butler] |
| 15826 | There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ [Chisholm] |
| 11910 | Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X' [Geach] |
| 16999 | A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke] |
| 16494 | We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative [Wiggins] |