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Single Idea 15831
[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
]
Full Idea
I suggest that states of affairs constitute the objects of the theory of explanation.
Gist of Idea
Explanations have states of affairs as their objects
Source
Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 4.4)
Book Ref
Chisholm,Roderick: 'Person and Object' [Open Court 1976], p.124
A Reaction
It is good to ask what the constituents of a theory of explanation might be. He has an all-embracing notion of state of affairs, whereas I would say that events and processes are separate. See Idea 15828.
Related Idea
Idea 15828
I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs [Chisholm]
The
18 ideas
with the same theme
[general ideas about the concept of explanation]:
11385
|
Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable
[Aristotle]
|
12367
|
What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest
[Aristotle]
|
12380
|
Universals are valuable because they make the explanations plain
[Aristotle]
|
12385
|
Are particulars explained more by universals, or by other particulars?
[Aristotle]
|
11243
|
Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
21473
|
All knowledge and explanation rests on the inexplicable
[Schopenhauer]
|
17086
|
Surprisingly, empiricists before Mill ignore explanation, which seems to transcend experience
[Mill, by Ruben]
|
15831
|
Explanations have states of affairs as their objects
[Chisholm]
|
8347
|
Explanations typically relate statements, not events
[Davidson]
|
14470
|
Explanatory exclusion: there cannot be two separate complete explanations of a single event
[Kim]
|
17081
|
Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation
[Ruben]
|
11951
|
Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid
[Molnar]
|
16850
|
Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth
[Lipton]
|
15005
|
Explanations must cite generalisations
[Sider]
|
15692
|
People tend to be satisfied with shallow explanations
[Gelman]
|
6754
|
We talk both of 'people' explaining things, and of 'facts' explaining things
[Bird]
|
6752
|
The objective component of explanations is the things that must exist for the explanation
[Bird]
|
17324
|
'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation
[Liggins]
|