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Full Idea
Brody bases sortal essentialism on the notion of a property that an individual must possess throughout its existence if it possesses it at any time in its existence.
Gist of Idea
Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence
Source
report of Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 7.1
Book Ref
Mackie,Penelope: 'How Things Might Have Been' [OUP 2006], p.119
A Reaction
Brody tends to treat categories as properties, which I dislike. How do you assess 'must' here? A person may possess a mole throughout life without it being essential.
Related Idea
Idea 15835 Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
| 15834 | Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
| 11895 | A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
| 12141 | Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody] |
| 12130 | a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody] |
| 12132 | Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody] |
| 12135 | Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody] |
| 12138 | Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation [Brody] |
| 12137 | De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody] |
| 12140 | Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody] |
| 12139 | Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody] |
| 12142 | Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody] |
| 12143 | An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody] |
| 12144 | Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody] |