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Single Idea 15854

[filed under theme 2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition ]

Full Idea

A primary element cannot be expressed in an account; it can only be named, for a name is all that it has. But with the things composed of these ...just as the elements are woven together, so the names can woven to become an account.

Gist of Idea

A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names

Source

Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 202b01-3)

Book Ref

Plato: 'Complete Works', ed/tr. Cooper,John M. [Hackett 1997], p.223

A Reaction

This is the beginning of what I see as Aristotle's metaphysics, as derived from his epistemology, that is, ontology is what explains, and what we can give an account [logos] of. Aristotle treats this under 'definitions'.

The 25 ideas with the same theme [give the true nature of something, not just a description]:

15854 A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato]
10944 A definition must be of something primary [Aristotle]
596 Only substance [ousias] admits of definition [Aristotle]
12360 Definitions need the complex features of form, and don't need to mention the category [Aristotle, by Wedin]
16107 Sometimes parts must be mentioned in definitions of essence, and sometimes not [Aristotle]
12145 Definitions are of what something is, and that is universal [Aristotle]
12384 Definition by division needs predicates, which are well ordered and thorough [Aristotle]
9066 You can define objects by progressively identifying what is the same and what is different [Aristotle]
12075 An Aristotelian definition is causal [Aristotle, by Witt]
8200 Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine]
15957 Essential definitions show the differences that discriminate things, and make them what they are [Boyle]
12976 If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz]
12984 Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities [Leibniz]
12982 One essence can be expressed by several definitions [Leibniz]
12915 Definitions can only be real if the item is possible [Leibniz]
11920 A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar]
11217 Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta]
12302 Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K]
11157 Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K]
14259 Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K]
9959 'Real' definitions give the essential properties of things under a concept [Mautner]
9376 A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian]
15118 A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki]
17311 Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki]
16030 'Nominal' definitions identify things, but fail to give their essence [Jones,J-E]