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Single Idea 15868
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
]
Full Idea
An 'idealisation' preserves all the properties of the source but it possesses these properties in some ideal or perfect form. ...An 'abstraction', on the other hand, lacks certain features of its source.
Gist of Idea
Idealisation idealises all of a thing's properties, but abstraction leaves some of them out
Source
Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 1)
Book Ref
Harré,Rom: 'Laws of Nature' [Duckworth 1993], p.35
A Reaction
Yet another example in contemporary philosophy of a clear understanding of the sort of abstraction which Geach and others have poured scorn on.
The
27 ideas
from 'Laws of Nature'
15869
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Reports of experiments eliminate the experimenter, and present results as the behaviour of nature
[Harré]
|
15868
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Idealisation idealises all of a thing's properties, but abstraction leaves some of them out
[Harré]
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15860
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We take it that only necessary happenings could be laws
[Harré]
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15867
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Laws describe abstract idealisations, not the actual mess of nature
[Harré]
|
15864
|
Classification is just as important as laws in natural science
[Harré]
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15865
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Newton's First Law cannot be demonstrated experimentally, as that needs absence of external forces
[Harré]
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15862
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Laws can come from data, from theory, from imagination and concepts, or from procedures
[Harré]
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15870
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Are laws of nature about events, or types and universals, or dispositions, or all three?
[Harré]
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15871
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Are laws about what has or might happen, or do they also cover all the possibilities?
[Harré]
|
15872
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Must laws of nature be universal, or could they be local?
[Harré]
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15875
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In counterfactuals we keep substances constant, and imagine new situations for them
[Harré]
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15876
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Maybe laws of nature are just relations between properties?
[Harré]
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15874
|
Scientific properties are not observed qualities, but the dispositions which create them
[Harré]
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15879
|
The Square of Opposition has two contradictory pairs, one contrary pair, and one sub-contrary pair
[Harré]
|
15881
|
We can save laws from counter-instances by treating the latter as analytic definitions
[Harré]
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15882
|
Since there are three different dimensions for generalising laws, no one system of logic can cover them
[Harré]
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15878
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Some quantifiers, such as 'any', rule out any notion of order within their range
[Harré]
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15880
|
In physical sciences particular observations are ordered, but in biology only the classes are ordered
[Harré]
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15885
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The necessity of Newton's First Law derives from the nature of material things, not from a mechanism
[Harré]
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15884
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Laws of nature remain the same through any conditions, if the underlying mechanisms are unchanged
[Harré]
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15886
|
Science rests on the principle that nature is a hierarchy of natural kinds
[Harré]
|
15889
|
It is because ravens are birds that their species and their colour might be connected
[Harré]
|
15890
|
Non-black non-ravens just aren't part of the presuppositions of 'all ravens are black'
[Harré]
|
15887
|
'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour
[Harré]
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15891
|
Traditional quantifiers combine ordinary language generality and ontology assumptions
[Harré]
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15888
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The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science
[Harré]
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15892
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Laws of nature state necessary connections of things, events and properties, based on models of mechanisms
[Harré]
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