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Full Idea
In drawing 'countefactual' conclusions we can be thought imaginatively to vary the conditions under which the substance, set-up etc. is manipulated or stimulated, while maintaining constant our conception of the nature of the being in question.
Gist of Idea
In counterfactuals we keep substances constant, and imagine new situations for them
Source
Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 2)
Book Ref
Harré,Rom: 'Laws of Nature' [Duckworth 1993], p.46
A Reaction
Presumably you could vary the substance and keep the situation fixed, but then the counterfactual seems to be 'about' something different. Either that or the 'situation' is a actually a set of substances to be tested.
| 15875 | In counterfactuals we keep substances constant, and imagine new situations for them [Harré] |
| 4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |
| 4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |
| 4398 | An event causes another just if the second event would not have happened without the first [Lewis, by Psillos] |
| 3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |
| 4208 | 'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe] |
| 4788 | Dowe commends the Conserved Quantity theory as it avoids mention of counterfactuals [Dowe, by Psillos] |
| 4780 | In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent [Psillos] |
| 4791 | Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur [Psillos] |
| 9489 | Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions [Bird] |