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Full Idea
The idea of the Dretske-Armstrong-Tooley view is very simple: the laws of nature relate properties to properties.
Gist of Idea
Maybe laws of nature are just relations between properties?
Source
Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 2)
Book Ref
Harré,Rom: 'Laws of Nature' [Duckworth 1993], p.48
A Reaction
Presumably the relations are necessary ones. I don't see why we need to mention these wretched 'universals' in order to expound this theory. It sounds much more plausible if you just say a property is defined by the way it relates to other properties.
| 8379 | In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell] |
| 16246 | Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong] |
| 9480 | Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 17681 | The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong] |
| 15876 | Maybe laws of nature are just relations between properties? [Harré] |
| 15093 | We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker] |
| 15237 | Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden] |
| 14639 | Individuals enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations [McMichael] |
| 9432 | Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars [Mumford] |
| 9433 | If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals [Mumford] |
| 9473 | Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals [Bird] |
| 9484 | If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law [Bird] |
| 19039 | The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism [Vetter] |