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Single Idea 1588

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied ]

Full Idea

Aristotle would be perfectly happy with the idea that the eyes are for the purpose of seeing. Spinoza would disagree. The objects of the world, including parts of living organisms, have purposes, but obey the laws of mechanical necessity.

Gist of Idea

For Spinoza eyes don't act for purposes, but follow mechanical necessity

Source

comment on Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.79

Book Ref

Roochnik,David: 'The Tragedy of Reason: the Platonic logos' [Routledge 1990], p.79


A Reaction

My view is that eyes wouldn't exist if they didn't see, which places them in a different category from inorganic matter.


The 14 ideas with the same theme [no aspect of nature contains genuine purpose]:

Theophrastus doubted whether nature could be explained teleologically [Theophrastus, by Gottschalk]
Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity [Aristotle]
Only Epicurus denied purpose in nature, for the whole world, or for its parts [Epicurus, by Annas]
Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon]
We will not try to understand natural or divine ends, or final causes [Descartes]
For Spinoza eyes don't act for purposes, but follow mechanical necessity [Roochnik on Spinoza]
Spinoza strongly attacked teleology, which is the lifeblood of classical logos [Roochnik on Spinoza]
Final causes are figments of human imagination [Spinoza]
The sun and rain weren't made for us; they sometimes burn us, or spoil our seeds [La Mettrie]
If the world aimed at an end, it would have reached it by now [Nietzsche]
'Purpose' is just a human fiction [Nietzsche]
The only human purpose is that created by our genetic history [Wilson,EO]
Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour [Searle]
People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms [Lycan]