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Single Idea 15968

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity ]

Full Idea

Identity is utterly simple and unproblematic. Everything is identical to itself; nothing is ever identical to anything except itself. There is never any problem about what makes something identical to itself; nothing can ever fail to be.

Gist of Idea

Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing

Source

David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 4.1)

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [Blackwell 2001], p.192


A Reaction

I have great problems with expressing this concept as a thing being 'identical to itself'. I will always say that it 'has an identity'. But then it is problematical, because what constitutes an identity? When do dispersing clouds lose it?

Related Ideas

Idea 15969 Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem [Lewis]

Idea 16143 It is absurd that a this and a substance should be composed of a quality [Aristotle]

Idea 19394 Inequality can be brought infinitely close to equality [Leibniz]


The 23 ideas with the same theme [relation of identity holding between a thing and itself]:

Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic [Benardete,JA on Aristotle]
We can't understand self-identity without a prior grasp of the object [Aristotle]
You are one with yourself in form and matter [Aristotle]
Two things can't occupy one place and time, which leads us to the idea of self-identity [Locke]
Everything is what it is, and not another thing [Butler]
'An object is the same with itself' is meaningless; it expresses unity, not identity [Hume]
Saying an object is the same with itself is only meaningful over a period of time [Hume]
Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept [Wittgenstein]
The 'property' of self-identity is uselessly tautological [Black]
The property of being identical with me is an individual concept [Chisholm]
A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver]
The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong]
A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke]
Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
If non-existent things are self-identical, they are just one thing - so call it the 'null object' [Bostock]
Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing [Lewis]
Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn]
Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn]
Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself? [Benardete,JA]
Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent [Benardete,JA]
Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K]
If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K]