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Single Idea 15976

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence ]

Full Idea

What is that texture of parts, that real essence, that makes lead, and antinomy fusible; wood and stone not?

Gist of Idea

What is the texture - the real essence - which makes substances behave in distinct ways?

Source

John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.06.09)

Book Ref

Locke,John: 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding', ed/tr. Nidditch,P.H. [OUP 1979], p.444

A Reaction

This quotation gives better support to Alexander's claim in Idea 15973. Locke actually says plainly that the texture (i.e. powerful combination of fine-grained corpuscles) is the essence of these substances (with, presumably, intrinsic powers).

Related Ideas

Idea 15971 Secondary qualities are powers of complex primary qualities to produce sensations in us [Locke]

Idea 15973 In my view Locke's 'textures' are groups of corpuscles which are powers (rather than 'having' powers) [Locke, by Alexander,P]

Idea 15974 The essence of whiteness in a man is nothing but the power to produce the idea of whiteness [Locke]

The 24 ideas with the same theme [powers as giving the essential nature of each thing]:

15658 The hidden harmony is stronger than the visible [Heraclitus]
16752 Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle]
16753 Giving the function of a house defines its actuality [Aristotle]
17206 The essence of a thing is its effort to persevere [Spinoza]
15976 What is the texture - the real essence - which makes substances behave in distinct ways? [Locke]
12750 The question is whether force is self-sufficient in bodies, and essential, or dependent on something [Lenfant]
12714 The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting [Leibniz]
5056 Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz]
13168 My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz]
13169 I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz]
12722 Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz]
12778 There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz]
12783 Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz]
13095 Essence is primitive force, or a law of change [Leibniz]
12713 Forms have sensation and appetite, the latter being the ability to act on other bodies [Leibniz, by Garber]
13087 The essence of a thing is its real possibilities [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
12050 Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity [Wiggins]
16755 The possible Aristotelian view that forms are real and active principles is clearly wrong [Fine,K, by Pasnau]
21350 If properties are powers, then causal relations are internal relations [Heil]
12256 We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg]
16767 There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau]
17954 Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter]
23711 A power is a property which consists entirely of dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23712 Powers are qualitative properties which fully ground dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]