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Single Idea 15976
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
]
Full Idea
What is that texture of parts, that real essence, that makes lead, and antinomy fusible; wood and stone not?
Gist of Idea
What is the texture - the real essence - which makes substances behave in distinct ways?
Source
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.06.09)
Book Ref
Locke,John: 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding', ed/tr. Nidditch,P.H. [OUP 1979], p.444
A Reaction
This quotation gives better support to Alexander's claim in Idea 15973. Locke actually says plainly that the texture (i.e. powerful combination of fine-grained corpuscles) is the essence of these substances (with, presumably, intrinsic powers).
Related Ideas
Idea 15971
Secondary qualities are powers of complex primary qualities to produce sensations in us [Locke]
Idea 15973
In my view Locke's 'textures' are groups of corpuscles which are powers (rather than 'having' powers) [Locke, by Alexander,P]
Idea 15974
The essence of whiteness in a man is nothing but the power to produce the idea of whiteness [Locke]
The
24 ideas
with the same theme
[powers as giving the essential nature of each thing]:
15658
|
The hidden harmony is stronger than the visible
[Heraclitus]
|
16752
|
Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter
[Aristotle]
|
16753
|
Giving the function of a house defines its actuality
[Aristotle]
|
17206
|
The essence of a thing is its effort to persevere
[Spinoza]
|
15976
|
What is the texture - the real essence - which makes substances behave in distinct ways?
[Locke]
|
12750
|
The question is whether force is self-sufficient in bodies, and essential, or dependent on something
[Lenfant]
|
12714
|
The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting
[Leibniz]
|
5056
|
Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity
[Leibniz]
|
13168
|
My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites
[Leibniz]
|
13169
|
I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity
[Leibniz]
|
12722
|
Thought terminates in force, rather than extension
[Leibniz]
|
12778
|
There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite
[Leibniz]
|
12783
|
Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality
[Leibniz]
|
13095
|
Essence is primitive force, or a law of change
[Leibniz]
|
12713
|
Forms have sensation and appetite, the latter being the ability to act on other bodies
[Leibniz, by Garber]
|
13087
|
The essence of a thing is its real possibilities
[Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
|
12050
|
Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity
[Wiggins]
|
16755
|
The possible Aristotelian view that forms are real and active principles is clearly wrong
[Fine,K, by Pasnau]
|
21350
|
If properties are powers, then causal relations are internal relations
[Heil]
|
12256
|
We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers
[Oderberg]
|
16767
|
There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding
[Pasnau]
|
17954
|
Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)?
[Vetter]
|
23711
|
A power is a property which consists entirely of dispositions
[Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
|
23712
|
Powers are qualitative properties which fully ground dispositions
[Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
|