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Single Idea 15983

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers ]

Full Idea

I suggest that Locke has explained the power, …but there is no longer any need to talk of powers since we can go straight from the internal structure to the phenomenon.

Gist of Idea

Locke explains powers, but effectively eliminates them with his talk of internal structure

Source

report of John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694]) by Peter Alexander - Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles 7

Book Ref

Alexander,Peter: 'Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles' [CUP 1985], p.152

A Reaction

This is rather the view of fans of categorical properties (as opposed to dispositions). If the corpuscles don't involve forces, this reading makes sense. It is, of course, wrong.

Related Ideas

Idea 15973 In my view Locke's 'textures' are groups of corpuscles which are powers (rather than 'having' powers) [Locke, by Alexander,P]

Idea 15972 The corpuscular theory allows motion, but does not include forces between the particles [Boyle, by Alexander,P]

The 18 ideas with the same theme [criticisms of the idea that there are 'powers' in reality]:

15983 Locke explains powers, but effectively eliminates them with his talk of internal structure [Locke, by Alexander,P]
13602 We cannot form an idea of a 'power', and the word is without meaning [Hume]
11950 We have no idea of powers, because we have no impressions of them [Hume]
11941 The distinction between a power and its exercise is entirely frivolous [Hume]
17772 Kant claims causal powers are relational rather than intrinsic [Kant, by Bayne]
14300 No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle]
11946 Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper]
18397 Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong]
18399 How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong]
17666 Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong]
17667 Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong]
17687 If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong]
8573 Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis]
14323 If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford]
14328 Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford]
14331 Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford]
14582 Might dispositions be reduced to normativity, or to intentionality? [Mumford/Anjum]
19014 How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms? [Vetter]