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Single Idea 15983
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
]
Full Idea
I suggest that Locke has explained the power, …but there is no longer any need to talk of powers since we can go straight from the internal structure to the phenomenon.
Gist of Idea
Locke explains powers, but effectively eliminates them with his talk of internal structure
Source
report of John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694]) by Peter Alexander - Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles 7
Book Ref
Alexander,Peter: 'Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles' [CUP 1985], p.152
A Reaction
This is rather the view of fans of categorical properties (as opposed to dispositions). If the corpuscles don't involve forces, this reading makes sense. It is, of course, wrong.
Related Ideas
Idea 15973
In my view Locke's 'textures' are groups of corpuscles which are powers (rather than 'having' powers) [Locke, by Alexander,P]
Idea 15972
The corpuscular theory allows motion, but does not include forces between the particles [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
The
18 ideas
with the same theme
[criticisms of the idea that there are 'powers' in reality]:
15983
|
Locke explains powers, but effectively eliminates them with his talk of internal structure
[Locke, by Alexander,P]
|
13602
|
We cannot form an idea of a 'power', and the word is without meaning
[Hume]
|
11950
|
We have no idea of powers, because we have no impressions of them
[Hume]
|
11941
|
The distinction between a power and its exercise is entirely frivolous
[Hume]
|
17772
|
Kant claims causal powers are relational rather than intrinsic
[Kant, by Bayne]
|
14300
|
No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency
[Ryle]
|
11946
|
Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects
[Popper]
|
18397
|
Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result
[Armstrong]
|
18399
|
How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over?
[Armstrong]
|
17667
|
Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties
[Armstrong]
|
17666
|
Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible
[Armstrong]
|
17687
|
If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers
[Armstrong]
|
8573
|
Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones.
[Lewis]
|
14323
|
If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case
[Mumford]
|
14328
|
Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes
[Mumford]
|
14331
|
Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms
[Mumford]
|
14582
|
Might dispositions be reduced to normativity, or to intentionality?
[Mumford/Anjum]
|
19014
|
How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms?
[Vetter]
|