more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
We are so far from knowing what figure, size or motion of parts produce a yellow colour, sweet taste, or sharp sound, that we cannot conceive how any size, figure or motion can produce in us the colour, taste or sound. There is no conceivable connection.
Gist of Idea
We can't begin to conceive what would produce some particular experience within our minds
Source
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.03.13)
Book Ref
Locke,John: 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding', ed/tr. Nidditch,P.H. [OUP 1979], p.292
A Reaction
There is a good case for naming Locke as the first mysterian, and he puts his finger here on what I think is the weirdest puzzle of the mind - why THAT experience for THAT stimulus. In the 21st century we should not give up so easily.
9114 | There are no secure foundations to prove the separate existence of mind, in reason or experience [William of Ockham] |
12500 | Thinking without matter and matter that thinks are equally baffling [Locke] |
15996 | We can't begin to conceive what would produce some particular experience within our minds [Locke] |
12552 | Thoughts moving bodies, and bodies producing thoughts, are equally unknowable [Locke] |
4154 | Why are we not aware of the huge gap between mind and brain in ordinary life? [Wittgenstein] |
3466 | Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle] |
4883 | Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel] |
3287 | We can't be objective about experience [Nagel] |
2540 | Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn] |
7388 | McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines [Dennett on McGinn] |
9318 | Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford] |
2404 | Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers] |
7059 | The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil] |