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Single Idea 16015

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity ]

Full Idea

If identity is problematic, it is difficult to see how the problem could be resolved, since it is difficult to see how a thinker could have the conceptual resources with which to explain the concept of identity whilst lacking that concept itself.

Gist of Idea

Problems about identity can't even be formulated without the concept of identity

Source

Harold Noonan (Identity [2009], §1)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.2


A Reaction

I don't think I accept this. We can comprehend the idea of a mind that didn't think in terms of identities (at least for objects). I suppose any relation of a mind to the world has to distinguish things in some way. Does the Parmenidean One have identity?


The 14 ideas with the same theme [whether identity can be defined - and how]:

You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable [Wittgenstein]
We can paraphrase 'x=y' as a sequence of the form 'if Fx then Fy' [Quine]
Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)]
Content is replaceable if identical, so replaceability can't define identity [Dummett, by Dummett]
Frege introduced criteria for identity, but thought defining identity was circular [Dummett]
The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law [Wiggins]
Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity [Wiggins]
Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities [Wiggins]
Identity is primitive [Wiggins]
Problems about identity can't even be formulated without the concept of identity [Noonan]
Identity is usually defined as the equivalence relation satisfying Leibniz's Law [Noonan]
Identity definitions (such as self-identity, or the smallest equivalence relation) are usually circular [Noonan]
Identity can only be characterised in a second-order language [Noonan]
Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be [McGinn]