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Single Idea 16038
[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
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Full Idea
It may be that for Locke 'real essences' and 'internal constitution' cannot be synonymous because, according to Locke, real essences are unknowable, but internal constitutions are knowable.
Gist of Idea
Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable
Source
report of John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.23.12) by Jan-Erik Jones - Real Essence §4.4
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.18
A Reaction
[He cites Susanna Goodin 1998; evidence for the first half is 4.6.5 and 12, and for the second is 2.23.12] One suggestion [citing 4.6.11] is that essence includes the powers, but constitution is the material components.
The
17 ideas
with the same theme
[distinctions about how essence should be understood]:
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11237
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Only universals have essence
[Plato, by Politis]
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12099
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Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory
[Aristotle, by Witt]
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15036
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An essence can either be universal (in the mind) or singular (in concrete particulars)
[Avicenna, by Panaccio]
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11203
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Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form
[Aquinas]
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22126
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Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence
[Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
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16038
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Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable
[Locke, by Jones,J-E]
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5444
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'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to
[Ellis]
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5450
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For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind
[Kripke, by Mautner]
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14656
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Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them?
[Plantinga]
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12066
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Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories
[Witt]
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11152
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Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties
[Fine,K]
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14256
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How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences?
[Fine,K]
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14258
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Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties
[Fine,K]
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15184
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Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities
[Sidelle]
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15681
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Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders?
[Gelman]
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14190
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Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual
[Paul,LA]
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17313
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Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times
[Koslicki]
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