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Full Idea
Metaphysical necessity is just as strong as logical necessity in that the space of metaphysical possibility is exactly the same as the space of logical possibility: the logically possible worlds = the metaphysically possible worlds.
Gist of Idea
The metaphysically and logically possible worlds are the same, so they are the same strength
Source
Karen Bennett (Supervenience [2011], §3.1)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.5
A Reaction
I think this is wrong. To be the 'same strength' there would also have to be the same number of logical as metaphysical truths, and I presume that is not the case. There are far more logical than metaphysical possibilities.
| 16039 | Supervenience: No A-difference without a B-difference [Bennett,K] |
| 16040 | Aesthetics, morality and mind supervene on the physical? Modal on non-modal? General on particular? [Bennett,K] |
| 16042 | The metaphysically and logically possible worlds are the same, so they are the same strength [Bennett,K] |
| 16044 | Some entailments do not involve supervenience, as when brotherhood entails siblinghood [Bennett,K] |
| 16043 | Supervenience is non-symmetric - sometimes it's symmetric, and sometimes it's one-way [Bennett,K] |
| 16046 | Reduction requires supervenience, but does supervenience suffice for reduction? [Bennett,K] |
| 16047 | Weak supervenience is in one world, strong supervenience in all possible worlds [Bennett,K] |
| 16049 | Definitions of physicalism are compatible with a necessary God [Bennett,K] |