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Full Idea
All definitions of physicalism are compatible with the existence of a necessarily existing God.
Gist of Idea
Definitions of physicalism are compatible with a necessary God
Source
Karen Bennett (Supervenience [2011], 5.4)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.31
A Reaction
All the definitions seem to depend on all the facts covarying with the physical facts, so anything which is invariant (such as divine or platonic entities) will stand outside the definition. Physicalism is more like a credo about all facts whatever.
| 16040 | Aesthetics, morality and mind supervene on the physical? Modal on non-modal? General on particular? [Bennett,K] |
| 16039 | Supervenience: No A-difference without a B-difference [Bennett,K] |
| 16042 | The metaphysically and logically possible worlds are the same, so they are the same strength [Bennett,K] |
| 16043 | Supervenience is non-symmetric - sometimes it's symmetric, and sometimes it's one-way [Bennett,K] |
| 16044 | Some entailments do not involve supervenience, as when brotherhood entails siblinghood [Bennett,K] |
| 16046 | Reduction requires supervenience, but does supervenience suffice for reduction? [Bennett,K] |
| 16047 | Weak supervenience is in one world, strong supervenience in all possible worlds [Bennett,K] |
| 16049 | Definitions of physicalism are compatible with a necessary God [Bennett,K] |