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Single Idea 16059

[filed under theme 9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change ]

Full Idea

The Growing Argument said any change of matter is a change of identity. Chrysippus presents it with a case (Dion and Theon) where material diminution is the necessary condition of enduring identity, since the diminished footless Dion survives.

Gist of Idea

Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity

Source

report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by AA Long / DN Sedley - Hellenic Philosophers commentary 28:175

Book Ref

'The Hellenistic Philosophers:Vol.1 translations', ed/tr. Long,A. /Sedley,D. [CUP 1987], p.175


A Reaction

[The example, in Idea 16058, is the original of Tibbles the Cat] This is a lovely bold idea which I haven't met in the modern discussions - that identity actually requires change. The concept of identity is meaningless without change?

Related Idea

Idea 16058 Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria]


The 17 ideas with the same theme [how identity fares when an object's properties change]:

For animate things, only the form, not the matter or properties, must persist through change [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Coming to be is by shape-change, addition, subtraction, composition or alteration [Aristotle]
Natural things are their own source of stability through change [Aristotle]
Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley]
If a republic can retain identity through many changes, so can an individual [Hume]
If identity survives change or interruption, then resemblance, contiguity or causation must unite the parts of it [Hume]
To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction [Harré/Madden]
Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity [Harré/Madden]
A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity [Harré/Madden]
Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic [Lewis, by Sider]
If a soldier continues to exist after serving as a soldier, does the wind cease to exist after it ceases to blow? [Benardete,JA]
A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe]
'Adverbialism' explains change by saying an object has-at-some-time a given property [Hawley]
Presentism solves the change problem: the green banana ceases, so can't 'relate' to the yellow one [Hawley]
The problem of change arises if there must be 'identity' of a thing over time [Hawley]
Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron]
How does a changing object retain identity or have incompatible properties over time? [Baron/Miller]