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Single Idea 16067

[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object ]

Full Idea

For those for whom 'constitution is not identity' (the 'constitution view'), constitution is said to be an asymmetric relation, and also a dependence relation (unlike identity).

Gist of Idea

Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation

Source

Ryan Wasserman (Material Constitution [2009], 2)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.4


A Reaction

It seems obvious that constitution is not identity, because there is more to a thing's identity than its mere constitution. But this idea makes it sound as if constitution has nothing to do with identity (chalk and cheese), and that can't be right.


The 21 ideas with the same theme [objects should be understood as what they are made of]:

Additional or removal of any part changes a thing, so people are never the same person [Epicharmus]
If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus]
Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table? [Kripke]
If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table [Kripke]
A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke]
Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K]
There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K]
Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker]
The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker]
Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker]
The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place [Hawley]
Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread [Hawley]
If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing? [Hawley]
Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V]
'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object [Merricks]
It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located [Merricks]
A hand constitutes a fist (when clenched), but a fist is not composed of an augmented hand [Simons]
There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki]
Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman]
Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman]
There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman]