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Full Idea
I want to resuscitate an essentialist argument against the view that constitution is identity, of the form 'x is essentially F, y is not essentially F, so x is not y'.
Gist of Idea
Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows
Source
Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], Intro)
Book Ref
-: 'Journal of Philosophy' [-], p.599
A Reaction
The point is that x might be essentially F and y only accidentally F. Thus a statue is essentially so, but a lump if clay is not essentially a statue. Another case where 'necessary' would do instead of 'essentially'.
| 16076 | Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker] |
| 16078 | Clay is intrinsically and atomically the same as statue (and that lacks 'modal properties') [Rudder Baker] |
| 16081 | The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker] |
| 16080 | Is it possible for two things that are identical to become two separate things? [Rudder Baker] |
| 16077 | The clay is not a statue - it borrows that property from the statue it constitutes [Rudder Baker] |
| 16082 | Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker] |