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Single Idea 1608

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions ]

Full Idea

When a statement of being or non-being is analysed by Russell's theory of descriptions it ceases to contain any expression which even purports to name the alleged entity, so the being of such an entity is no longer presupposed.

Gist of Idea

The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed

Source

report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Willard Quine - On What There Is p.6

Book Ref

'Metaphysics - An Anthology', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Kim,J. [Blackwell 1999], p.6


The 25 ideas with the same theme [rewriting of descriptive terms to show underlying logic]:

Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A]
Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G]
Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell]
The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell]
Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell]
Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk]
Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell]
The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine]
Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan]
Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey]
The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich]
Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell]
Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh]
Names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell showed how to eliminate those [Quine]
'The present King of France is bald' presupposes existence, rather than stating it [Strawson,P, by Grayling]
Russell asks when 'The King of France is wise' would be a true assertion [Strawson,P]
If 'Queen of England' does not refer if there is no queen, its meaning can't refer if there is one [Cooper,DE]
For Russell, expressions dependent on contingent circumstances must be eliminated [Kaplan]
Names do not have scope problems (e.g. in placing negation), but Russell's account does have that problem [Bostock]
Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane]
On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false [Jacquette]
Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B]
Definites descriptions don't solve the empty names problem, because the properties may not exist [Sawyer]