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Single Idea 16094

[filed under theme 2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition ]

Full Idea

It is impossible to define particulars. …The fact is that an account is general.

Gist of Idea

You can't define particulars, because accounts have to be generalised

Source

Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1040a33-)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Metaphysics', ed/tr. Lawson-Tancred,Hugh [Penguin 1998], p.224


A Reaction

Aristotle rejects attempts to define the Sun as possible counterexamples. Since this claims rests on the idea of an account [logos], I presume the point is actually that definitions are linguistic, and must use general words.


The 11 ideas with the same theme [whether there are different sorts of definition]:

You can't define particulars, because accounts have to be generalised [Aristotle]
A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz]
Only that which has no history is definable [Nietzsche]
A 'constructive' (as opposed to 'analytic') definition creates a new sign [Frege]
A definition by 'extension' enumerates items, and one by 'intension' gives a defining property [Russell]
A decent modern definition should always imply a semantics [Hacking]
A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta]
Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta]
Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta]
Implicit definitions must be satisfiable, creative definitions introduce things, contextual definitions build on things [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert]
'Creative definitions' do not presuppose the existence of the objects defined [Fine,K]