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Single Idea 16097

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences ]

Full Idea

Aristotle shows that, for something to be a subject at all, it must be specifiable as something in itself, with essential properties that are mentioned in its defining account, since no subject can be the bearer of accidental properties alone.

Gist of Idea

To be a subject a thing must be specifiable, with some essential properties

Source

report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z.3) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.2

Book Ref

Gill,Mary Louise: 'Aristotle on Substance: Paradox of Unity' [Princeton 1989], p.41


A Reaction

This is Aristotle supporting the very modern necessary-properties view of essentialism. Notice that it emerges from being 'specifiable' - that is, from Aristotle's requirement that a logos and definition be available. He rejects bare particulars.


The 40 ideas with the same theme [each individual has its own distinct essence]:

Things don't have every attribute, and essence isn't private, so each thing has an essence [Plato]
A primary substance reveals a 'this', which is an individual unit [Aristotle]
Particulars are not definable, because they fluctuate [Aristotle]
The essence of a single thing is the essence of a particular [Aristotle]
Essence is the cause of individual substance, and creates its unity [Aristotle, by Witt]
Individual essences are not universals, since those can't be substances, or cause them [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotelian essence is not universal properties, but individual essence [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotle does not accept individual essences; essential properties are always general [Aristotle, by Kung]
Aristotle's essence explains the existence of an individual substance, not its properties [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotle takes essence and form as a particular, not (as some claim) as a universal, the species [Aristotle, by Politis]
To be a subject a thing must be specifiable, with some essential properties [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle]
We can conceive an individual without assigning it to a kind [Locke, by Jolley]
You can't distinguish individuals without the species as a standard [Locke]
Many individuals grouped under one name vary more than some things that have different names [Locke]
Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz]
We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz]
Refinement of senses increasingly distinguishes individuals [Novalis]
We begin with concepts of kinds, from individuals; but that is not the essence of individuals [Nietzsche]
The essence of individuality is beyond description, and hence irrelevant to science [Russell]
We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer]
A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics [Chisholm]
It makes no sense to ask of some individual thing what it is that makes it that individual [Strawson,P]
Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences [Ellis]
We can forget about individual or particularized essences [Wiggins]
Only individuals have essences, so numbers (as a higher type based on classes) lack them [McMichael]
Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G]
Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G]
Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K]
Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg]
An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne]
An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
Particular essence is often captured by generality [Steiner,M]
Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki]
Hylomorphic compounds need an individual form for transworld identity [Koslicki]
An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami]