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Single Idea 16106

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species ]

Full Idea

Man and horse and items similarly imposed on the particulars but themselves general are not substances but a kind of composite of the relevant account in the relevant matter, considered universally.

Gist of Idea

Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter

Source

Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1035b27)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Metaphysics', ed/tr. Lawson-Tancred,Hugh [Penguin 1998], p.204

A Reaction

Notice that these concepts are 'imposed' on particulars. This seems close to Locke's 'nominal' essence. It take this quotation to reinforce the priority of the particular in Aristotle's account.

The 18 ideas with the same theme [essence for animals is the species they belong to]:

16106 Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter [Aristotle]
16144 Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species [Aristotle]
12359 'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence [Aristotle, by Wedin]
12068 Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species [Aristotle, by Witt]
16141 In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
16149 Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing [Aristotle]
13434 In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species [Locke]
16035 If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles [Locke]
16036 Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five? [Locke]
12987 For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz]
12906 Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists [Leibniz]
16955 Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Kripke, by Dummett]
16996 Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge [Kripke]
17370 Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences [Devitt]
17368 Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category [Devitt]
17388 It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré]
17389 A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré]
17870 Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers [Almog]