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Single Idea 16110

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking ]

Full Idea

On account of the difficulty [about unity] some philosophers have espoused participation, though this plunges them into difficulties about what the cause of the participation is, or indeed what participating is anyway.

Gist of Idea

If partaking explains unity, what causes participating, and what is participating?

Source

Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1045b07)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Metaphysics', ed/tr. Lawson-Tancred,Hugh [Penguin 1998], p.250

A Reaction

The target here is Plato, and I agree with the criticism. Exactly the same problems face those who talk of an object 'instantiating' a property. I have no idea what such a relationship could be.

The 21 ideas with the same theme [how particulars are said to relate to Forms]:

304 Beautiful things must be different from beauty itself, but beauty itself must be present in each of them [Plato]
212 The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato]
213 Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato]
215 If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato]
216 If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato]
218 Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato]
1 There is only one source for all beauty [Plato]
368 Other things are named after the Forms because they participate in them [Plato]
4447 If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato]
17 A Form applies to a set of particular things with the same name [Plato]
317 The universe is basically an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it [Plato]
556 If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato]
16110 If partaking explains unity, what causes participating, and what is participating? [Aristotle]
633 If you accept Forms, you must accept the more powerful principle of 'participating' in them [Aristotle]
643 How can the Forms both be the substance of things and exist separately from them? [Aristotle]
647 There is a confusion because Forms are said to be universal, but also some Forms are separable and particular [Aristotle]
2475 Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor]
17946 Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas]
10722 Instantiation is set-membership [Oliver]
6900 A prior understanding of beauty is needed to assert that the Form of the Beautiful is beautiful [Westaway]
7964 How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them? [Macdonald,C]