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Single Idea 16128
[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
]
Full Idea
A 'substance' might be defined to be an object which does not depend for its existence upon any other object (where dependency is defined in terms of necessity.
Gist of Idea
A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects
Source
E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1.3)
Book Ref
Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.10
A Reaction
I'm inclined to leave out 'substance', which has too much historical baggage, and talk of minimal things having 'identity', and proper things having 'essence'.
The
67 ideas
from 'The Possibility of Metaphysics'
16414
|
Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions
[Lowe, by Hofweber]
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16063
|
Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed'
[Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow]
|
8258
|
Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs
[Lowe]
|
9414
|
Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities
[Lowe, by Mumford]
|
8260
|
Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds)
[Lowe]
|
8267
|
Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality
[Lowe]
|
8265
|
Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value
[Lowe]
|
8263
|
An object is an entity which has identity-conditions
[Lowe]
|
8262
|
How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea?
[Lowe]
|
8266
|
Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous
[Lowe]
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8268
|
Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity
[Lowe]
|
8269
|
Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them
[Lowe]
|
8270
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Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects
[Lowe]
|
8271
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An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times
[Lowe]
|
8272
|
How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes?
[Lowe]
|
8273
|
Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental?
[Lowe]
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8275
|
Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects
[Lowe]
|
8276
|
Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual
[Lowe]
|
8279
|
The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin?
[Lowe]
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8280
|
While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change
[Lowe]
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8283
|
Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former
[Lowe]
|
8281
|
Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance
[Lowe]
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8282
|
Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change
[Lowe]
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8284
|
The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent
[Lowe]
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8285
|
I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence
[Lowe]
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8286
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Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects
[Lowe]
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8288
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Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not
[Lowe]
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8289
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The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted
[Lowe]
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8292
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Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence
[Lowe]
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8291
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Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind
[Lowe]
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8290
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One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter
[Lowe]
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8293
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Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature
[Lowe]
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8294
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How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes?
[Lowe]
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8295
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Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle?
[Lowe]
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8296
|
Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide?
[Lowe]
|
16127
|
Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is
[Lowe]
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16131
|
The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit
[Lowe]
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16128
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A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects
[Lowe]
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16130
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To be an object at all requires identity-conditions
[Lowe]
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15079
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'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws
[Lowe]
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8298
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Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa
[Lowe]
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8297
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Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality
[Lowe]
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8299
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Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts
[Lowe]
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8301
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Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them
[Lowe]
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8300
|
Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void)
[Lowe]
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8302
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Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another
[Lowe]
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8306
|
You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable
[Lowe]
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8303
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Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types
[Lowe]
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8305
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A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it
[Lowe]
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8307
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Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables
[Lowe]
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8308
|
Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations
[Lowe]
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8310
|
Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do?
[Lowe]
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8309
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A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members
[Lowe]
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8311
|
If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2
[Lowe]
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8312
|
It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation
[Lowe]
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8313
|
Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria
[Lowe]
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8314
|
Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents?
[Lowe]
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8315
|
Maybe facts are just true propositions
[Lowe]
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8316
|
Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations
[Lowe]
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8317
|
To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects
[Lowe]
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8318
|
The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents
[Lowe]
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8319
|
One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items
[Lowe]
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8320
|
Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world?
[Lowe]
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8321
|
All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects
[Lowe]
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8322
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I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions
[Lowe]
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8323
|
It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast?
[Lowe]
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13122
|
Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete
[Lowe, by Westerhoff]
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