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Single Idea 16141
[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
]
Full Idea
In the central books of 'Metaphysics' there are no longer any genera or species. In Z.13 he argues that genera and universals can't be substances. Since genera are not qualities either, they disappear completely from the ontology.
Gist of Idea
In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology
Source
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z.13) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V
Book Ref
Frede,Michael: 'Essays in Ancient Philosophy' [University of Minnesota 1987], p.26
A Reaction
Music to my ears. It is so obvious to me that creatures are classified into genera, so genera can't exist separately, that I am bewildered anyone would believe or imply it.
Related Idea
Idea 12351
Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance [Aristotle, by Wedin]
The
18 ideas
with the same theme
[essence for animals is the species they belong to]:
16106
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Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter
[Aristotle]
|
16144
|
Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species
[Aristotle]
|
12359
|
'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence
[Aristotle, by Wedin]
|
12068
|
Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
16141
|
In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
16149
|
Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing
[Aristotle]
|
13434
|
In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species
[Locke]
|
16035
|
If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles
[Locke]
|
16036
|
Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five?
[Locke]
|
12987
|
For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member
[Leibniz]
|
12906
|
Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists
[Leibniz]
|
16955
|
Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent
[Kripke, by Dummett]
|
16996
|
Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge
[Kripke]
|
17370
|
Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences
[Devitt]
|
17368
|
Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category
[Devitt]
|
17388
|
It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds
[Dupré]
|
17389
|
A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one
[Dupré]
|
17870
|
Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers
[Almog]
|