more from this thinker     |     more from this text

Single Idea 16149

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species ]

Full Idea

'Man', and every generic term, denotes not an individual substance but a quality or relation or mode or something of the kind.

Gist of Idea

Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing

Source

Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations [c.331 BCE], 179a01)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Sophistical Refutations, On the Cosmos etc (III)', ed/tr. Forster,E.S. /Furley,D.J. [Harvard Loeb 1955], p.117

A Reaction

This is Aristotle's denial that species constitutes the essence of anything. I take 'man' to be a categorisation of individuals, and is ontologically nothing at all in its own right.

The 18 ideas with the same theme [essence for animals is the species they belong to]:

16106 Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter [Aristotle]
16144 Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species [Aristotle]
12359 'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence [Aristotle, by Wedin]
12068 Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species [Aristotle, by Witt]
16141 In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
16149 Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing [Aristotle]
13434 In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species [Locke]
16035 If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles [Locke]
16036 Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five? [Locke]
12987 For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz]
12906 Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists [Leibniz]
16955 Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Kripke, by Dummett]
16996 Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge [Kripke]
17370 Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences [Devitt]
17368 Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category [Devitt]
17388 It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré]
17389 A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré]
17870 Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers [Almog]