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Single Idea 16160

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity ]

Full Idea

It just is not the case that individuals are the individuals they are by virtue of some intrinsic essential distinguishing mark.

Gist of Idea

For Aristotle, things are not made individual by some essential distinguishing mark

Source

report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], id) by Michael Frede - Substance in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' p.78

Book Ref

Frede,Michael: 'Essays in Ancient Philosophy' [University of Minnesota 1987], p.78


A Reaction

That invites the question what does distinguish qualitatively identical things from one another. I'm not sure if Aristotle even bothers about that question.


The 21 ideas with the same theme [a special property marking a thing's uniqueness]:

Doesn't each thing have an essence, just as it has other qualities? [Plato]
For Aristotle, things are not made individual by some essential distinguishing mark [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
We can call the quality of Plato 'Platonity', and say it is a quality which only he possesses [Boethius]
The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Scotus said a substantial principle of individuation [haecceitas] was needed for an essence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction [Leibniz]
The laws-of-the-series plays a haecceitist role [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity [Chisholm]
Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity [Chisholm]
A snowball's haecceity is the property of being identical with itself [Plantinga, by Westerhoff]
Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga]
'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
Adams says actual things have haecceities, but not things that only might exist [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker]
A 'thisness' is a thing's property of being identical with itself (not the possession of self-identity) [Adams,RM]
There are cases where mere qualities would not ensure an intrinsic identity [Adams,RM]
The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal [Wiggins]
Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien]
Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity [Jubien]
Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
A haecceity is a set of individual properties, essential to each thing [Read]
A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P]