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Single Idea 16161

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties ]

Full Idea

On Aristotle's new theory it is forms that exist in their own right, whereas properties merely constitute the way forms of a certain kind are realized at some point of time in their existence.

Gist of Idea

Properties are just the ways in which forms are realised at various times

Source

report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], props) by Michael Frede - Substance in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' p.80

Book Ref

Frede,Michael: 'Essays in Ancient Philosophy' [University of Minnesota 1987], p.80

A Reaction

I'm not sure that 'merely' gives us enough of a story here. I never understand the word 'realised' (or 'instantiated', come to that). What does x have to do to realise y? Is that a relation between a real and a non-real thing?

The 35 ideas with the same theme [what we should take a property to be]:

7935 There cannot be uninstantiated properties [Aristotle, by Macdonald,C]
16161 Properties are just the ways in which forms are realised at various times [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
15109 The 'propriae' or 'necessary accidents' of a thing are separate, and derived from the essence [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
12282 An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle]
16648 Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus]
23227 Each object has a precise number of properties, each to a precise degree [Fichte]
10606 Frege treats properties as a kind of function, and maybe a property is its characteristic function [Frege, by Smith,P]
8461 The category of objects incorporates the old distinction of substances and their modes [Quine]
15827 Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had' [Chisholm]
15830 Some properties can never be had, like being a round square [Chisholm]
7024 Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil]
17679 All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong]
15550 Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis]
13584 The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property [Ellis]
15095 A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker]
15097 I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker]
15092 Formerly I said properties are individuated by essential causal powers and causing instantiation [Shoemaker, by Shoemaker]
6993 Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson]
16443 Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker]
15751 Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed? [Lewis]
15735 Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them [Lewis]
9656 The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy [Lewis]
8571 Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis]
9295 Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann]
11915 If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar]
10719 There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties [Oliver]
10721 If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete? [Oliver]
14595 Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer]
10399 If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer]
10416 Can properties have parts? [Swoyer]
16230 Maybe the only properties are basic ones like charge, mass and spin [Hawley]
17989 Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber]
13795 Properties only have identity in the context of their contraries [Elder]
23708 Humeans see properties as having no more essential features and relations than their distinctness [Friend/Kimpton-Nye, by PG]
23709 Dispositions are what individuate properties, and they constitute their essence [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]